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Adopting Civil Damages: Wrongful
Family Separation in Adoption
Malinda L. Seymore*
Abstract
The Trump Administration’s new immigration policy of family
separation at the U.S./Mexico border rocked the summer of 2018.
Yet family separation is the prerequisite to every legal adoption. The
circumstances are different, of course. In legal adoption, the
biological parents are provided with all the constitutional
protections required in involuntary termination of parental rights,
or they have voluntarily consented to family separation. But what
happens when that family separation is wrongful, when the birth
mother’s consent is not voluntary, or when the birth father’s wishes
to parent are ignored? In theory, the child can be returned to the
birth parents when consent is invalid because of fraud, coercion, or
deceit. In actuality, courts are very reluctant to undo an adoption.
How, then, to deter adoption agencies and workers from wrongfully
separating birth parents and their children?
Adoption agencies are not just social welfare institutions, but
also businesses motivated by money. Lawsuits, as a cost of doing
business, can affect their bottom line. The adoption industry has
been responsive in the past to lawsuits from adoptive parents
seeking money damages, which suggests that lawsuits from birth
parents that affect the bottom line could incentivize better behavior
from adoption agencies. This Article explores possible tort causes of
action available to birth parents, including a proposed new tort of
wrongful family separation, with the long-term objective of
changing adoption agency behavior, potentially transforming
adoption practice.
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I. Introduction
#FamiliesBelongTogether
—Twitter1
Is this what family is like: the feeling that everyone’s connected,
that with one piece missing, the whole thing’s broken?
—Trenton Lee Stewart2

1.
2.

This is a popular hashtag posted by Twitter users on twitter.com.
TRENTON LEE STEWART, THE MYSTERIOUS BENEDICT SOCIETY 255 (2007).
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The Trump Administration’s new policy of family separation
of immigrants crossing the U.S./Mexico border rocked the summer
of 2018.3 Stories of children held away from their families in cages,4
audio recordings of children screaming as they are dragged away
from their parents,5 all serve as the backdrop for a policy deemed
by many as cruel and inhumane.6 Yet family separation is the
prerequisite to every legal adoption.7 The circumstances are
different, of course. In adoption, the biological parents are provided
with all the constitutional protections of parenthood required in
involuntary termination of parental rights, or they have
voluntarily consented to family separation—that, too, is a
prerequisite to adoption.8 But what happens when that family
3. See Louise Radnofsky, Natalie Andrews & Farnaz Fassihi, Trump
Defends Family-Separation Policy, WALL STREET J., https://www.wsj.com
/articles/trump-administration-defends-family-separation-policy-1529341079
(last updated June 18, 2018) (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (stating that the Trump
Administration is blaming Congress for the family separation policy at the
border) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Nomaan Merchant, Hundreds of Children Wait in Border Patrol
Facility
in
Texas,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(June
18,
2018),
https://apnews.com/9794de32d39d4c6f89fbefaea3780769/Hundreds-of-childrenwait-in-Border-Patrol-facility-in-Texas (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See Ginger Thompson, Listen to Children Who’ve Just Been Separated
from Their Parents at the Border, PROPUBLICA (June 18, 2018, 3:51 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/children-separated-from-parents-borderpatrol-cbp-trump-immigration-policy (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See David Adler, Trump’s Family Separation Policy: Cruel, Inhumane,
ST.
J.
(June
26,
2018),
Tragic,
IDAHO
https://idahostatejournal.com/opinion/columns/trump-s-family-separation-policycruel-inhumane-tragic/article_1f93cc9b-3918-550c-81b2-0f50ec16d9ab.html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2019) (arguing that Trump’s family separation policy is immoral)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Richard Wolffe, Trump’s Cruel
Border Policies Created a Needless Crisis. It’s Far from Over, GUARDIAN (June 20,
2018,
5:25
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/
20/trumps-cruel-border-policies-created-needless-crisis-far-from-over
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2019) (arguing that President Trump created the border crisis)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant: Minors’ Consent in
Abortion and Adoption, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 148 (2013) (“[For adoption,]
a court must first terminate the parental rights of the birth parents before
granting parental rights to the adoptive family.” (citing 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption
§ 170 (2013)).
8. See id. (“The Supreme Court has long recognized parental rights as
fundamental rights under the Constitution.” (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
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separation is wrongful, when the birth mother’s consent is not
voluntary,9 or when the birth father’s wishes to parent are
ignored?10 In theory, the child can be returned to the birth parents
when consent is invalid because of fraud, coercion, or deceit.11 In
actuality, courts are very reluctant to undo an adoption.12
Consider the case of Tammy Lemley in Lemley v. Barr.13
Tammy’s boyfriend convinced her to relinquish their child for
adoption, but Tammy was upset and refused to sign the papers at
the attorneys’ office.14 He convinced her to return the next day to
sign the papers, which she did.15 But she was underage, making
her consent void under Ohio law.16 The lawyers told her after she
turned eighteen that she needed to sign more papers—actually,
she needed to sign papers once she reached majority because the
previous papers were void.17 That same day, her parents went to
the lawyers to ask for the return of the child and to point out that
Tammy’s consent was void because she was underage.18 The
lawyers refused, having already delivered the child to a couple in
645, 651 (1972)).
9. See id. (stating that consent must be “freely and willingly” given).
10. See id. (arguing that a minor needs additional protection when signing a
consent to adoption).
11. See generally Marywood v. Vela, 53 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. 2001) (holding that
the adoption consent was involuntary when the birth mother was promised an
open adoption that was not legally enforceable in Texas); Queen v. Goeddertz, 48
S.W.3d 928, 932 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that the adoption consent was
involuntary when the birth father was given an unenforceable promise of
continued visitation post-adoption).
12. See infra note 24 and accompanying text (stating that courts are
reluctant to undo adoptions because such actions infringe on the adopted child’s
rights).
13. 343 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1986).
14. See id. at 102–03 (“Tammy Lemley became upset, refused to sign the
papers and left with the child.”).
15. See id. at 103 (stating that the couple later returned and signed the
consent papers).
16. See id. (noting that an Ohio probate court judge had to witness and
approve a minor’s consent).
17. See id. (stating that the couple met again with the lawyers to sign papers
after Tammy Lemley reached eighteen).
18. See id. (stating that Tammy Lemley’s parents tried to explain that
Tammy was only a minor at the time).
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West Virginia for adoption.19 Tammy sued in Ohio and the court
found that the lawyers “had obtained Tammy’s consent through
duress, that she had no understanding of her position at the time
she signed the adoption papers and, therefore, her consent was
invalid.”20 Throughout the suit, the prospective adoptive parents
refused to allow the lawyers to reveal their identities or the
location of the child and during the pendency of the Ohio case, they
went to court in West Virginia and finalized the adoption.21 When
the Ohio court ordered the attorneys to reveal the identity of their
clients, Tammy then went to court in West Virginia to seek return
of her child.22 The West Virginia Supreme Court ruled that their
state must give full faith and credit to the Ohio decree, making the
West Virginia adoption void.23 The story does not end there,
however. The court refused to order the return of the child without
first examining the best interest of the child:
The record before us is devoid of detailed evidence concerning
what is now in the best interests of Ryan Barr. But we do know
from the facts of record that Ryan is a five-year-old child who
has spent almost his entire life with an adoptive mother, father
and siblings in Huntington, West Virginia. If we now transfer
custody to Miss Lemley, who counsel informs us has married,
he will be taken to another place and brought up by people who
are complete strangers to him. Although we cannot say that this
is not in his best interests, we can at least say that there is some
question in our mind whether such action is appropriate.
Consequently, we remand this case to the circuit court for a
determination of what physical custody arrangement is in
Ryan’s best interests.24

Tammy’s case is unremarkable in one sense—birth parents
rarely succeed in reversing an adoption.25 It is quite remarkable in
19. See id. (stating that the lawyer said it was too late to do anything).
20. Id.
21. See id. (explaining that the adopting parents purposely avoided the Ohio
court’s jurisdiction).
22. See id. (detailing that the Lemley family sought relief in the West
Virginia court).
23. See id. (stating that the West Virginia Supreme Court ordered that the
lower court must give the Ohio court judgment full faith and credit).
24. Id. at 109.
25. See id. at 109–10 (“The court expressed an interest in protecting the state
adoption system and stated that the ‘system obviously could be greatly injured if
prospective adoptive parents could not rely on the availability of children placed
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another sense—she fought through numerous court battles,
something most birth parents cannot afford. Lawyers to fight an
adoption don’t come cheap.
In this Article, I argue that adoption agencies and facilitators
operate as businesses as much as child welfare organizations. As
long as it remains profitable to behave as the attorneys in Tammy’s
case behaved, there is little downside to doing so. Courts are
unlikely to disrupt the adoption,26 so lawyers and agencies lack
incentive to behave better in avoiding wrongful family separation.
If birth parents sue for money damages, driving up the cost of
fraudulent practices, agencies might be deterred from misconduct
that leads to wrongful family separation. After all, “[a]gencies and
social workers fear lawsuits.”27 Further, suing for money damages
incentivizes lawyers to take the case because they will recover a
contingency fee if successful.
In 1978, Elisabeth Landes and Richard Posner applied the
lens of law and economics to adoption.28 The explicit use of market
terminology: “supply and demand for babies,”29 “baby market,”30
“free-market value of the child,”31 and comparing adoptable
children in foster care to “an unsold inventory stored in a
warehouse,”32 was disquieting for some readers. Many pushed back
against the view that adoption of children in any way resembled a
market.33 Margaret Brinig’s response to Posner’s proposal to price
in their custody.’” (quoting In re Revocation of Appointment of a Guardian, 271
N.E.2d 621, 624 (Mass. 1971)).
26. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
27. Harvey Schweitzer & Daniel Pollack, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in
Adoption Social Work, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 258 (2006).
28. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 323 (1978).
29. Id. at 324.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 328.
32. Id. at 327.
33. See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoption, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 59, 59 (1987) (arguing that many critics have criticized the article The
Economics of the Baby Shortage). Almost ten years later, Posner followed up with
an article in which he mentions scholarly criticism both temperate and
intemperate. See Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and the
Ideology of the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 688 n.51 (1979); J. Robert
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babies in an adoption market was different: “The truth is that an
adoption market already exists, however distasteful that may
seem.”34 It is impossible to ignore the fact that adoption is “a nearly
$2 billion-a-year U.S. business that is growing fast.”35 In Dr.
Elizabeth Raleigh’s study of adoption agency workers, she found
frequent references to the business nature of adoption.36
One element of proof that adoption is a consumer-driven
market responsive to litigation risk is the response of agencies to
the flurry of lawsuits brought in the 1980s against adoption
agencies by adoptive parents alleging fraud and/or negligence in
adoption placements.37 Adoptive parents essentially claimed that
adoption agencies failed to disclose information about the child’s
physical and/or mental health, and that if the adoptive parents had
been informed they would not have gone through with the
adoption.38 These “wrongful adoption” lawsuits led to voluntary
changes in agency practice and statutes mandating disclosure
requirements,39 allowing agencies to avoid the risk of further
lawsuits.
This history suggests that adoption agencies—like most
businesses—will be responsive to lawsuits that will affect their

S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 347–57 (1984). Indeed,
a virtual cottage industry has sprung up to critique Posner’s market theory of
adoption. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L.
REV. 105, 105 (1987) (questioning Posner’s economic approach to “baby markets”);
John J. Donohue III & Ian Ayres, Posner’s Symphony No. 3: Thinking About the
Unthinkable, 39 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (1987) (“Our purpose, however, is to
provide an internal critique.”); Tamar Frankel & Frances H. Miller, The
Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 99, 99–103 (1987)
(stating that economic theory is inapplicable to adoptions).
34. Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect of Transactions Costs on the Market for
Babies, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 553, 554 (1994).
35. Sue Zeidler, Internet Transforms U.S. Adoption Process, REUTERS (July
23,
2004),
https://www.smh.com.au/technology/net-transforms-us-adoptionprocess-20040723-gdjef1.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See ELIZABETH RALEIGH, SELLING TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION: FAMILIES,
MARKETS, AND THE COLOR LINE 30 (2018) (‘“You know, it is a business. We provide
a fabulous service, but at the end of the day, we are a business. Which I would
never want you to quote, since it doesn’t sound right.’”).
37. Infra notes 134–146 and accompanying text.
38. Infra notes 134–146 and accompanying text.
39. Infra notes 134–146 and accompanying text.
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bottom lines.40 They have not been responsive, however, to
lawsuits from birth parents who seek the return of a relinquished
child, claiming that the relinquishment was involuntary.41 These
suits are rarely successful, with courts extremely reluctant to
remove children from the adoptive parents they know to return
them to biological parents who are strangers.42 Even when courts
find that the relinquishment was involuntary, even when procured
by fraud, courts will still conclude that it would not be in the best
interest of the child to disrupt the adoption.43 Adoption agencies
and their lawyers are aware of this clear trend, and will
strategically delay the litigation to make stronger the argument
that it would be harmful to the child to disrupt the placement.44
Adoption agencies may well be responsive, however, to
litigation that increases their cost of doing business and eats into
their profit margin. This Article explores possible litigation
strategies by birth parents and adoptees, with the long-term
objective of changing adoption agency behavior. There have been a
few successful lawsuits for money damages brought by birth
parents, alleging fraud and/or tortious interference with parental
relations.45 There may well be other successful tort claims possible,
including legal malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. This Article further suggests that courts should recognize
a new cause of action for wrongful family separation in adoption.
While such lawsuits will not result in the objective most
desired by the birth parents—return of the child—the lawsuits
may have a long-term effect on agency practice and thus benefit all
birth parents in the long run. After all, one function of tort law is
to deter bad behavior.46 Exploring the business nature of adoption
40. See discussion infra Part II.A (listing how adoption agencies have
minimized risk).
41. Supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.
42. Supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.
43. Supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.
44. Supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.
45. See discussion infra Part II.C (listing examples of possible remedies in
adoption lawsuits).
46. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J.
513, 525 (2003) (stating that the two goals of tort law are deterrence and
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practice and suggesting litigation strategies to leverage best
practices by adoption agencies could significantly change agency
behavior, potentially transforming practice in adoption.
II. The Business Model of Adoption
You know, it is a business. We provide a fabulous service, but
at the end of the day, we are a business.
—Alyssa Hollis47
As for the children, they are subject to the same economic forces
as automobiles or toasters. Supply and demand. Whatever the
market will bear.
—Adam Pertman48

There has long been an economic as well as child welfare
model of adoption.49 Justifications for adoption relied on the
economic benefit it provided to the adoptive family.50 In ancient
Rome, adoption was a mechanism to secure services to a childless
person51 and ensure an heir for purposes of inheritance.52 In early
America, apprenticeship and “putting out” children for service was
the precursor to adoption.53 “The economic ‘value’ of the child was
compensation).
47. Alyssa Hollis, adoption agency director, in RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 30.
48. ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 51 (2011).
49. See C.M.A. McCauliff, The First English Adoption Law and Its American
Precursors, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 656, 656 (1986) (tracing the legal history of
adoption from antiquity to the modern period).
50. See id. at 657 (“[T]he concept underlying all adoption was the
strengthening of the adopter’s family.”).
51. See id. at 656 (noting that an old, childless person was permitted to adopt
so as to have a family member to perform important memorial services for a
family’s ancestors).
52. See id. at 658 (explaining how adoption “served as a will substitute”).
53. See ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE
MODERN UNITED STATES 23 (2008) (“[I]ndenture was not an unusual means of
securing children for adoption: 36 percent were eventually adopted, and those
children indentured at young ages were far more likely to become legal members
of the families in which they were placed.”); Susan L. Porter, A Good Home:
Indenture and Adoption in Nineteenth-Century Orphanages, in ADOPTION IN
AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 27, 27–28 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002) (noting
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critical under these arrangements.”54 In one early account, these
arrangements broke down when they were a “bad bargain”—“the
great majority of children who are returned after being placed in
homes are returned . . . because of their inability to render a
certain amount of services which the foster parents rightfully
expected.”55
Adoption was “utilized more for the economic uses of child
labor than for the good of the children.”56 There were “free homes”
available, “in which children received care without monetary
compensation,” and thereby “approximated a modern adoption
ideal founded on love rather than labor or exchange.”57 But these
arrangements were rarer than arrangements based on
fee-for-service or labor.58 When older children were placed in
homes, “the reasons had at least as much to do with labor as with
love.”59 When prospective families petitioned orphanages and child
welfare agencies for children, “inquiries about taking in older
children frequently specified that children would work for wages,
experience or a combination of both.”60 One petitioner bluntly
stated that he was requesting an adolescent girl because his
household lacked servants.61
The passage of the first formal adoption statute to incorporate
the concept of “best interest of the child,” the Massachusetts
that adoption in this era was “understood more as an offshoot of
indenture . . . rather than as a legal arrangement based on mutual sentiment”);
Danielle Saba Donner, The Emerging Adoption Market: Child Welfare Agencies,
Private Middlemen, and “Consumer” Remedies, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 473,
476 (1996) (“Early relationships within the adoption triad are traditionally
characterized as economic in nature, as evidenced by the popular use of
apprenticeship or indenture contracts well into the twentieth century.”).
54. Donner, supra note 53, at 476.
55. Id. at 476–77 (quoting RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION
AND DISRUPTION: RATES, RISKS AND RESPONSES 39 (1988)).
56. Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of
Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 459 (1971).
57. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 23.
58. See id. (“Many of these children were never legally adopted, however,
and free homes were always scarcer than homes in which board was paid.”).
59. Id. at 24.
60. Id. at 26.
61. Id.
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statute of 1851, is said to have marked the transition from viewing
adoption as an economic enterprise to a child welfare enterprise.62
Modern adoption “rejected reciprocal economic obligations as a
bogus basis for kinship and celebrated intimacy, emotion and
desire. In the rhetoric of modern adoption law and reform, ‘human
values’ trumped material considerations.”63
But Julie Berebitsky notes that language of commodification
of children was common in adoption dialogue in the early twentieth
century:
For example, we see this perspective in 1924, when reformer
Josephine Baker told readers of Ladies’ Home Journal that
every child-caring agency she consulted emphasized that “there
are not enough children to go around, for the demand is always
greater than the supply.” In a slightly different vein, the
Saturday Evening Post published “The Baby Market in 1930,
an article that used stock market metaphors to discuss the
growing popularity of adoption. According to the author, it was
a “big bull market,” with “baby securities” promising “investors”
plenty of “dividends” paid out in toothless smiles and endless
giggles.64

There was explicit commodification of children in the practice
of commercial adoption at this time as well.65 “Baby farmers
62. See E. Wayne Carp, Introduction: A Historical Overview of American
Adoption, in ADOPTION IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 6 (E. Wayne Carp
ed., 2002) (noting that in the quarter century after the act’s passage an additional
twenty-four states enacted similar laws); HERMAN, supra note 53, at 21
(describing the Massachusetts act as the “opening bell of the modern adoption
era”). Even today, adoption still can be seen as requiring service from the adoptee.
See RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION AND DISRUPTION: RATES,
RISKS AND RESPONSES 39 (1988)
Parents continue to require that the placement result in some kind of
“services” although the service has changed from an economic service
to service to the cause of family efficiency, togetherness, and
satisfaction. In a few placements, the service is more specific—“to be a
companion to our only son,” was the candid way one couple, who had a
disrupted placement, described their reason for wanting to adopt an
older child. Another adopting couple expressed the desire for a child
“who could eventually go to Princeton.”
63. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 28.
64. JULIE BEREBITSKY, LIKE OUR VERY OWN: ADOPTION AND THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF MOTHERHOOD, 1851–1950, at 4 (2000).
65. See Carp, supra note 62, at 11 (“[N]otorious adoption mills . . . accepted
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profited on both ends of child exchange, first extracting fees from
desperate birth mothers and then demanding large sums from
adopters.”66 Doctors and midwives at commercial maternity homes
were paid “surrender fees” by unwed mothers and then offered the
child for adoption for a fee from the adoptive parents.67 Children
available for adoption were advertised in newspapers, causing
concern among reformers that they “reduced children’s worth to
money.”68 There were frequent incidents of baby-selling
throughout the country starting in the 1920s, including some
extensive organizations rather than isolated incidents.69
Even charitably-run “amateur” adoption agencies—run by
wealthy, philanthropic women instead of professional social
workers—were vulnerable to charges of baby selling. Professional
agencies did not charge fees to adoptive families at this time, while
charitable ones “openly solicited large donations from adopters.”70
Families of more modest means felt that wealthy prospective
parents were able to buy children or ascend to the top of waiting
lists because of such donations.71 One of the most infamous
adoption-for-profit schemes in America was operated by Georgia
Tann through the Tennessee Children’s Home and funneled
children into the homes of celebrities and those able to pay large
fees.72 Before the scandal was uncovered, Tann had placed at least
payment when adoptive parents received children, ignored commonly accepted
social work practices, and provided inadequate safeguards for everyone directly
involved in the adoption.”).
66. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 36.
67. Id.; see Jonathan G. Stein, A Call to End Baby Selling: Why the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption Should Be Modified to Include the Consent
Provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 39, 50–51 (2001)
(noting the primacy of doctors and lawyers in the black market baby trade).
68. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 39; see LINDA TOLLETT AUSTIN, BABIES FOR
SALE: THE TENNESSEE CHILDREN’S HOME ADOPTION SCANDAL x (1993) (noting that
the selling of children was a “widespread practice” in the latter half of the
nineteenth century).
69. See PERTMAN, supra note 48, at 52 (detailing two large baby-selling
operations in Tennessee and Georgia).
70. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 45.
71. BEREBITSKY, supra note 64, at 5 (noting that these lower-income parents
often “expressed outrage at this material evaluation of family life”).
72. AUSTIN, supra note 68, at 1 (describing how the scandal rocked the city
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1,500 children illegally throughout the country,73 including into
the Hollywood homes of Lana Turner, June Allyson, Dick Powell,
Joan Crawford,74 and Smiley Burnette.75 It was believed that Tann
netted around one million dollars from the scheme,76 and worked
in conjunction with a prominent juvenile court judge to accomplish
it.77
Professional adoption agencies did not initially charge fees to
adoptive parents.78 In the 1940s, social workers began to debate
whether to charge such fees.79 Some argued in opposition that such
fees suggested that the agencies were serving the needs of adoptive
parents instead of needy children or impoverished birth mothers.80
If they charged fees, would they be “faced with the charge of giving
human life for money?”81 Others saw such fees as nothing more
of Memphis and received extensive news coverage). See generally BARBARA
BISANTZ RAYMOND, THE BABY THIEF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF GEORGIA TANN, THE
BABY SELLER WHO CORRUPTED ADOPTION (2008); MADELYN FREUNDLICH, ADOPTION
AND ETHICS: THE MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION 5 (2000).
73. See AUSTIN, supra note 68, at 1 (noting also that the racket had existed
for at least ten years); HERMAN, supra note 53, at 142–43 (“Problems included
little advance investigation, no probationary oversight, and the exchange of large
amounts of cash.”).
74. The Joan Crawford adoption was made more notorious because of the
film Mommie Dearest, the story told from the perspective of adoptee Christina
who was abused and traumatized by her adoptive mother. MOMMIE DEAREST
(Paramount Pictures 1981). The movie was based on the book of the same title.
See generally CHRISTINA CRAWFORD, MOMMIE DEAREST (1978). Crawford did not
meet the adoption standards of the day because she was twice divorced and a
single working mother, necessitating the illegal adoption from Georgia Tann. See
Brian Paul Gill, Adoption Agencies and the Search for the Ideal Family, 1918–1965,
in ADOPTION IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 160, 170–71 (E. Wayne Carp ed.,
2002) (noting that agencies largely refused to adopt children to single parents
during this time period).
75. See AUSTIN, supra note 68, at 71 (noting that at the same time Tann was
also actively lobbying the California legislature to close orphanages).
76. Id. at 1.
77. Id.; see also PERTMAN, supra note 48, at 52 (noting that Tann usually sold
the babies to wealthy out-of-state couples for over $700 each); Stein, supra note
67, at 51 (“Tann perpetuated her scheme by convincing birth mothers to give up
their babies at birth in exchange for payment, including room and board.”).
78. See Donner, supra note 53, at 487 (accepting instead only “gratitude
payments” from adoptive parents).
79. See id. (tracing the history of the debate).
80. See id. (explaining that many social workers resisted adoption services
becoming an act “purely of business”).
81. BEREBITSKY, supra note 64, at 5.

908

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895 (2019)

than payment for services, akin to the charges other professionals
like lawyers and doctors charged clients.82 Until 1945, professional
adoption agencies “maintained that financial transactions between
adopters and agencies were strictly unethical.”83 Thereafter, they
began to charge nominal fees with the understanding that they
represented a fee for services rather than a child’s “sticker price.”84
Even today, large adoption fees in the U.S. raise questions:
Big money threatens to undermine the confidence that
prospective parents and the general public must have if
adoption is to fit comfortably into America’s cultural mosaic,
without people developing a new set of negative views about the
process. When the sums involved are so large, they also can blur
the vision—and raise questions about the motive—of
well-intentioned professionals.85

A social worker voiced concern about high fees today, saying,
“The one thing that really bothers me is the amount of money
exchanged. . . . I am afraid on some level, how much of those
expenses cover real services, and how much does it feed an
industry?”86
One of the arguments for charging fees for adoption services
was that adoptive parents would prefer the “businesslike” footing
fee-for-services would place them on: “[It] mirrored interactions in
other areas of their lives. Whereas the recipient of charity was
powerless, a couple paying a fee acquired the power of the
consumer, which enabled them to demand better service from the
agency.”87
This new view of adopters as fee-paying consumers, coupled
with the growing consumer rights movements in the U.S.,
82. See id. at 5 (noting that social work was becoming increasingly
recognized as a legitimate profession at this time).
83. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 45.
84. BEREBITSKY, supra note 64, at 5.
85. PERTMAN, supra note 48, at 51.
86. RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 59.
87. BEREBITSKY, supra note 64, at 5; see also JUDITH S. MODELL, KINSHIP WITH
STRANGERS: ADOPTION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF KINSHIP IN AMERICAN CULTURE 51
(1994) (noting the view that adoption became a service for infertile couples rather
than a service for needy children).
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empowered prospective adoptive parents to see themselves “as
equal to agencies or as their adversary.”88 “Adoptive
applicants . . . demanded that agencies treat them as informed
consumers rather than passive beneficiaries.”89 An adoption
researcher writing in 1966 noted a change in prospective adoptive
parents’ “perception of their consumer’s right to determine in part
their treatment, and their organization and use of political
activity.”90
Part of the shift toward a consumer approach to adoption was
a focus on remedies available to adoptive parents when adoptions
failed.91 Starting in the 1920s, there was statutory authority
permitting adoptive parents to nullify an adoption if a child
exhibited “feeble-mindedness” or insanity, as if breaching some
implied warranty.92 But those statutes were largely repealed in the
1960s and 1970s.93 But starting in the 1980s, courts began to
recognize another consumer remedy in the tort of wrongful
adoption.94
Not only did prospective adoptive parents begin to see
themselves as consumers in a commercial transaction with
agencies, agencies began to see their enterprise as market-driven
as well. In a fascinating recent study focused on adoption workers,
Dr. Elizabeth Raleigh interviewed adoption social workers and
88. Donner, supra note 53, at 494 (quoting Elizabeth S. Cole, Societal
Influences on Adoption Practice, in ADOPTION: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS 15, 18
(Paul Sachdev ed., 1984)).
89. Id. at 500.
90. Id. at 500 n.202 (quoting IRIS GOODACRE, ADOPTION POLICY AND PRACTICE
24 (1966)); see also RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 8 (describing situations when “the
parent paying the bills becomes the de facto client”).
91. See Donner, supra note 53, at 510 (noting that choosing the remedies for
failed adoptions “evokes an equally important moral versus market discourse”).
92. Id. (explaining that these statutes were potentially inspired by the
eugenics theories that “pervaded” the adoption practice during the period).
93. See id. at 513 (noting that only a few jurisdictions continue to even “claim
to reserve” the right to annul an adoption (citing Ann Harlan Howard, Annulment
of Adoption Decrees on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L. 549, 550 (1984))).
94. The first case to recognize the cause of action was Burr v. Board of
County Commissioners, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ohio 1986) (“It would be a
travesty of justice and a distortion of the truth to conclude that deceitful
placement of this infant, known by appellants to be at risk, was not actionable
when the tragic but hidden realities of the child’s infirmities finally came to
light.”).
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other agency personnel about their roles at the cross-section of
business interests and child welfare.95 While social workers will
assert that adoption is child-focused, they must recognize that they
“operate under a model of client services in which the revenue that
they take in from paying customers forms the foundation of their
organization’s long-term solvency.”96 Social workers spoke frankly
about non-child welfare factors the agencies considered in deciding
“which children get served and why.”97 One explained with regard
to international adoption: “There are tons of kids in need of homes
in places where social workers don’t want to go work in or where it
is going to be too expensive.”98 The social worker continued, “We
are opening and closing programs to see which ones we can afford.
It is an industry at the end of the day, I suppose.”99
Dr. Raleigh notes that the market focus of adoption agencies
has become more acute in the past decade as the adoption
marketplace has changed with reduced availability of the babies
and toddlers that adoption consumers were interested in
adopting.100 When adoption was booming, agencies “were less
interested in the financial considerations involved in sustaining a
small business. . . . these workers did not have to worry about
paying the rent or making payroll.”101 Now, with the downturn in
adoption, the focus has to shift—as one worker put it, “This is a
business, and we have to make business decisions.”102
Dr. Raleigh’s research is suggestive of the amenability of
adoption agencies to the same profit-driven decision-making as
other businesses. One element of business decision-making is
avoiding costly litigation.103 When courts began to recognize the tort
95. See generally RALEIGH, supra note 36.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 4 (noting that the drop in international babies available for
adoption has been especially pronounced).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Schweitzer & Pollack, supra note 27, at 258 (stating that litigation
risk is a factor affecting adoption agency behavior).

ADOPTING CIVIL DAMAGES

911

of wrongful adoption, adoption agencies significantly changed their
practices to avoid such lawsuits.104 If faced with new litigation risks
from other sources—birth parents and adoptees—adoption agencies
could be nudged into better practices to respect their rights going
forward. The next Part of this Article will examine that history of
responsiveness to adoptive parent suits for wrongful adoption before
turning to theories of legal liability that might serve as grounds for
birth parents and adoptees to subject agencies to legal risk.
III. Adoptive Parents Suing Agencies—Wrongful Adoption
I didn’t want to have to stand up in any courtroom and say, “I
wouldn’t have chosen this child.” . . . How do you say that to your
son—I never would have adopted you?
—Phyllis Juman105

Adoption has long been perceived as risky for adoptive
parents.106 There was a strain of eugenics thinking and focus on
heritability of bad character that often chilled interest in
adoption.107 “Strong beliefs in behavioral heredity—the children of
104. See Donner, supra note 53, at 517 (noting that recognition of the tort of
wrongful adoption “set the stage for a remarkable transformation in adoption
practice”).
105. Mother who ultimately sued agency for wrongful adoption, speaking
about her reluctance to do so. Lisa Belkins, What the Jumans Didn’t Know About
Michael,
N.Y.
TIMES
(March
14,
1999),
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/14/magazine/what-the-jumans-didn-t-knowabout-michael.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
106. See Sandra Sufian, As Long as Parents Can Accept Them: Medical
Disclosure, Risk, and Disability in Twentieth-Century American Adoption
Practice, 94 BULL. HIST. MED. 94, 97 (2017) (noting that the adoption service has
long struggled with how much information prospective parents should receive
about an adopted child’s medical history).
107. See Donner, supra note 53, at 483–84 (noting that one commentator
stated that to put a “mental defective” in a home that expected a “normal child”
was a “social crime”). Prominent eugenicists of the 1920s and 1930s opposed
adoption outright. See HERMAN, supra note 53, at 31 (“Anxieties regarding
eugenics were a prominent feature of the antiadoption climate.”). To adopt
children with mental defects, according to one famous eugenicist, was to
“contaminate the gene pool.” Id. He was, however, willing to condone “risky”
placements as long as the adoptive parents “were committed to keeping their
children from marrying to avoid transmitting the ‘defective’ trait.” Sufian, supra
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women who had sex out of wedlock were thought to have ‘bad
blood,’ and consequently, ‘blood will tell.’ Adoptive parents would
be saddled with children genetically predisposed to bad behaviors
‘which cause family heartache.’”108 “Race, religion, physical health,
mental health, criminality, educability, sexual morality,
intelligence and temperament were all associated with blood.”109
Prominent eugenicists of the 1920s and 1930s opposed adoption
outright.110 To adopt children with mental defects, according to one
famous eugenicist, was to “contaminate the gene pool.”111 He was,
however, willing to condone “risky” placements as long as the
adoptive parents “were committed to keeping their children from
marrying to avoid transmitting the ‘defective’ trait.”112
A. Agencies Mitigating Risk
To minimize the risk, adoption agencies undertook to screen
children for adoptability.113 In one child-placing manual for social
workers, the author cautioned, “to put a low grade mental defective
in a family home where a normal child was expected
is . . . inexcusable in a well-ordered and progressive child-placing
agency.”114 Preadoption investigation of a child’s current health
and heritable factors was considered crucial to “avoiding the error
of placing unqualified children.”115 According to this thinking,
agencies were looking to place only “the perfect child with the
note 106, at 99.
108. Seymore, supra note 7, at 112 (citing ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN:
A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES 29–30 (2009)).
109. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 30.
110. See id. at 64 (basing much of this concern on the “quality” of available
children).
111. Id. at 65.
112. Sufian, supra note 106, at 99; ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: A
HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES 65–66 (2008).
113. See Gill, supra note 74, at 166–67 (noting that both would-be adopters
and adoptees had to meet the agency’s approval).
114. Donner, supra note 53, at 484 (quoting WILLIAM H. SLINGERLAND,
CHILD-PLACING IN FAMILIES: A MANUAL FOR STUDENTS AND SOCIAL WORKERS 69
(1919)).
115. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 64.
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perfect background.”116 “Cradle adoptions,” those adoptions of very
young infants, were considered especially risky since the babies
were being placed before there was sufficient time to evaluate their
mental fitness.117 One well-known adoption agency was criticized
for keeping newborns for as little as forty days for observation, “an
observation period considered dangerously short by social workers
who stressed the enormous risks.”118 Eugenicists advised that
parents should, if possible, only take the child “on approval,” to
avoid the risk of adopting a “bad seed.”119
Preadoption screening of the child was the method for
reducing the risk inherent in the eugenics view of adoption.120 By
the 1920s, it was believed that tests for intelligence and physical
health were sufficiently accurate as to assure prospective adoptive
parents that they were not participating in “a grab-bag”
“eugenically speaking.”121 One orphanage physician was confident
of his ability to screen out the risk, bragging that in all his
experience with a great many adoptions, “I have yet to know one
where the parents regretted the adoption.”122 It was one’s biological
children who presented the risk, he opined, not “the child who can
be inspected and passed upon by competent authority.”123

116. See Donner, supra note 53, at 488; HERMAN, supra note 53, at 30
(explaining that adoptive parents and facilitators believed that “only normal,
healthy children were suitable candidates for adoption”).
117. See HERMAN, supra note 53, at 66 (detailing several examples of adopted
children eventually diagnosed with various mental and health problems).
118. Id.
119. See id. (noting that this risk was one of adoption’s “most obvious risks”).
120. See FREUNDLICH, supra note 72, at 5 (stating that the screening included
intelligence and physical health tests); Gill, supra note 74, at 167 (noting the
types of screenings some argued agencies should use to keeping “defective”
children off the adoption market).
121. See FREUNDLICH, supra note 72, at 5 (noting that the most desirable
children at the time were baby girls with blue eyes and blonde hair); Sufian, supra
note 106, at 104 (noting prevailing beliefs that testing of children even under one
year of age could accurately account for mental and psychological abilities).
122. HERMAN, supra note 55, at 42.
123. Id.; see Gill, supra note 74, at 168 (explaining that “agencies ‘were
convinced and attempted to convince the public that they could guarantee them
a perfect child . . . and adopting a child was a far less risky procedure than having
one normally,’” according to Joseph Reid, Executive Director of the Child Welfare
League of America).
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Still, as a hedge against the risk, one agency would place a
child with an uncertain genetic history only if the adoptive parents
would sign a binding agreement to return the child “if and when
abnormal characteristics appeared.”124 A right of rescission of an
adoption decree if a child, unknown at the time of adoption,
suffered from “retardation, epilepsy, insanity, venereal disease,
and so on” became a part of statutory law as early as the 1920s.125
While courts were generally reluctant to nullify adoptions, they
would do so because they felt it was in the long-term interest of
adoption as an institution—the possibility of annulment if the
child fails to satisfy would make adoptive parents more willing to
adopt in the first instance.126 By the 1960s, however, most of these
rescission statutes had been repealed, and agencies were
reconfiguring their ideas of which children were adoptable.127
B. Adoptive Parents and Assumption of the Risk
The market in adoption had changed once again, with more
couples looking to adopt post-World War II:
The American eugenics movement tapered off, taking with it
notions of biological determinism that had deterred adoption.
Adoptive parents were offered an image of “transplanted
flowers” that would thrive in the new family, and not revert to
124. See HERMAN, supra note 55, at 65 (noting that some agencies offered
written assurance of a right of return of the unsatisfactory child).
125. See id. at 171 (stating that state laws frequently allowed this kind of
annulment); Donner, supra note 53, at 510 (noting that these statutory schemes
likely reflected the concern for eugenics at the time).
126. See Donner, supra note 53, at 511–12 (discussing how some courts used
a Posnerian theory and treated the adoption process as if it had a warranty).
127. See id. at 513 (citing Ann Harlan Howard, Annulment of Adoption
Decrees on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L. 549 (1984)); John R. Maley,
Note, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment
for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 715
(1987) (noting that the purpose of recent legislative trends “is to make no
provision for annulment of the adoption”); Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence
of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 481 (1988) (noting
that most annulment statutes have been repealed and that at the time the article
was written, only California allowed adoption annulment based on the child’s
physical or mental condition).
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the “bad blood” of the birth parents. The importance of
parenting—especially mothering—emerged with the post-war
baby boom. Infertile couples wanted in on the baby boom, and
with less concern that behavior was biologically determined,
adoption became an appealing option.128

“Perfect” children were not as numerous as the families
seeking to adopt, so agencies changed their focus to finding the
right family for a child, rather than finding the perfect child for a
family.129 Rather than ensuring against risk for adoptive parents,
willingness to accept the risk of a less-than-perfect child became
the hallmark of an acceptable adoptive parent.130 A prospective
parent who balked at “the risks of reasonable unknowns” might
not be the kind of parent capable of unconditional love necessary
for adoption.131 Under this view, there were some agencies that felt
that “nothing should be told to adoptive parents regarding a child’s
background.”132 Not all agreed, but there were ongoing
disagreements among adoption professionals about “what
constitutes information that is dangerous or not necessary to
share.”133
In 1932, the adoption standards of the Child Welfare League
of America (CWLA) provided that if there were risks involving a
particular child, there should be disclosure so that “the adoptive
parents thoroughly understand the child’s condition and needs.”134
128. Seymore, supra note 7, at 114; see ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE
PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 127–49
(1995) (discussing the villainization of childless adults in the post-World War II
era and post-war “baby craze”).
129. See Donner, supra note 53, at 490 (discussing the child centered
approach to adoption matching); Sufian, supra note 106, at 106 (noting that the
new philosophy following World War II considered the child’s right to have a
stable home).
130. See Donner, supra note 53, at 490 (discussing the adoptive screening
criteria that includes the prospective parents’ ability to “accept a child
wholeheartedly while knowing the risks” (internal citations omitted)).
131. See id. (noting that this ability to weigh risks was seen as a sign that the
prospective parents were “normal” and “well-adjusted”).
132. See id. (quoting the sentiment expressed at the Child Welfare League’s
1955 Annual Conference).
133. See id. n.129 (quoting MICHAEL SCHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION
PRACTICE 87 (1956)).
134. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 24
(1932); Sufian, supra note 106, at 99.
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A physician warned in a 1937 Journal of the American Medical
Association article that withholding information about a child’s
health and genetic risk “is tantamount to fraud,” and that agencies
would subject themselves to professional liability for their failure
to disclose.135
But by the 1950s, agencies and adoption professionals had
begun to restrict the information about health and social history
shared with adoptive parents.136 The CWLA standards had
changed by 1959 to advise agencies not to provide “information
which is not relevant to the child’s development and would only
arouse anxiety.”137 Social workers would provide “only ‘selected
background material,’ with all ‘sordid or irrelevant’ details
deleted,” believing that “sharing only favorable information would
assist the child in building a sense of positive self-esteem.” 138
Adoptive parents also did not need to hear negative information:
“Irrelevant or unverified information (which included background
medical and genetic information) was of little benefit to the
parent-child relationship, and such information could cause
damage by arousing anxiety and apprehension.”139
Given the prevailing notion that parents should accept the
risk inherent in adoption, courts generally rejected suits for money
damages for wrongful adoption.140 In a 1958 case where the
adoptive parents sought to annul an adoption and also sought
“monetary damages from [an adoption agency] for medical costs
135. See Sufian, supra note 106, at 102 (discussing the physician’s opinion
that adoption agencies must manage, amount other things, “the risk of
professional liability”).
136. See MADELYN FREUNDLICH & LISA PETERSON, WRONGFUL ADOPTION: LAW,
POLICY & PRACTICE 2 (1998) (stating that two dynamics were at work: concerns
about the stigma for adopted children and the adoptive parents’ reluctance to
discuss adoption with adopted children).
137. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 134, at 27.
138. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 3 (noting that social
workers “largely rejected recommendations that background information be
completely withheld” (internal citations omitted)).
139. Id.
140. See John Gibeaut, Disclosing Birth Secrets: More States Allow Adoptive
Parents’ Suits when Agencies Lie, 84 A.B.A.J. 34, 35 (1998) (“The first courts to
confront wrongful adoption claims were leery of letting the genie too far out of the
bottle.”).
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incurred in caring for the child,” the court simply ignored the plea
for money damages.141 Two decades later, two California courts
refused to recognize causes of action in tort against adoption
agencies.142 The tide was about to turn again, however, with social
workers once again announcing that best practices required full
disclosure by adoption agencies—“In 1978, CWLA again revised its
adoption standards in response to these practice developments.
The 1978 standards deleted references to withholding adverse
information and emphasized the importance of providing adoptive
parents with the child’s developmental, medical, and genetic
history . . . .”143
Despite the embrace of full disclosure of standards by adoption
professionals, the actual practice did not mirror these idealized
expectations.144 Madelyn Freundlich, who literally wrote the book
on wrongful adoption, states, “Although there may be a desire to
consider failures to disclose as unusual deviations from standard
agency practice, research suggests otherwise.”145 In one study,
more than one-third of adoptive parents were not informed of a
history of physical abuse and over one-half were not told of a child’s
history of sexual abuse.146 Freundlich suggests multiple reasons
for the failure of agencies to follow best practices on disclosure,
from a fear that prospective adoptive parents will be scared away
141. See Allen v. Allen, 330 P.2d 151, 154–57 (Or. 1958) (affirming that there
is no right to set aside adoptions unless a statute says otherwise without
discussing the appellants’ petition for compensation for medical costs); Maley,
supra note 127, at 716 (noting that “the Oregon Supreme Court held that absent
statutory authority on the subject, the adoptive parents have no right to set aside
adoptions, even in cases of fraud”).
142. See Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 106 Cal. App. 3d 860,
866 (1980) (finding that the adoption agency disclosed all the facts about the
child’s health as they existed when the agency placed the child with the plaintiffs);
Smith v. Alameda Cty. Soc. Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941–43 (1979)
(finding no valid claim for public policy reasons and because “the injury and
damages are highly uncertain in terms of their nature, cause and existence”); see
also LeMay, supra note 127, at 478–79 (discussing the Richard P. case).
143. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 5.
144. See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text (discussing research that
suggests a significant portion of adoptive parents are not informed of their
adoptive child’s history of abuse).
145. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 8.
146 See id. at 8 (discussing RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION
AND DISRUPTION: RATES, RISKS AND RESPONSES (1988)).
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by negative information to their failure to secure the needed
information from birth parents to fully disclose.147 One
commentator has suggested that when the only remedy was
annulment of the adoption, rather than money damages, agencies
weren’t incentivized to follow better practices:
Still another downfall of the remedy is its inherent lack of
deterrent value against future fraudulent practices. If, for
instance, an adoption home misrepresents a child’s
background . . . an annulment proceeding merely requires the
home to take over the care of the child until another adoption is
perfected. Although this may inconvenience the home and force
it to incur additional expense and paperwork, it is unlikely that
it will bring about increased scrutiny of potential future
abuses.148

But as courts began to impose legal liability for wrongful
adoption and legislatures began to mandate disclosure, agencies
showed better compliance with disclosure rules.149
C. Remedies when Risk was Realized
1. The Courts Respond
Ohio became the first state to recognize the tort of wrongful
adoption.150 It was a small opening: the Ohio Supreme Court
147. See id. at 9–10 (listing other reasons including breakdowns in
communication because of high turnover at agencies and lack of access from
sending countries).
148. Maley, supra note 127, at 718.
149. See id. at 711 (“Future acts of adoption fraud are also more likely to be
deterred under the wrongful adoption theory because the wrongdoers will be
subject to monetary liability for the damages they inflict.”).
150. See Burr v. Bd. of Cty. Commissioners, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ohio
1986) (finding that the public adoption agency had to “be held accountable for
injuries resulting from the deceitful and material misrepresentations which [the
court found] were foreseeably and justifiably relied on by appellees”); see also
Maley, supra note 127, at 710 (discussing the Burr case as a “novel case”); D.
Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: The
Limits of Liability For Wrongful Adoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 851, 854 (1992)
(noting that the Ohio Supreme Court was the first court “to recognize a right to
compensatory damages against an adoption agency for misrepresentations to
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warned, “In no way do we imply that adoption agencies are
guarantors of their placements. Such a view would be tantamount
to imposing an untenable contract of insurance that each child
adopted would mature to be healthy and happy. Such matters are
solely in the hands of a higher authority.”151 Only in the face of “the
deliberate act of misinforming this couple,” not mere failure to
disclose the inherent risks, could a suit be successful.152
a. Fraud and Deliberate Misrepresentation
In 1964, the Burrs adopted a seventeen-month-old boy on the
representation from the agency that he “was a nice big, healthy,
baby boy” who had been born at the local hospital to an
eighteen-year-old mother who had been living with her parents.153
In reality, the birth mother was a thirty-one-year-old patient at a
mental hospital, as was the presumed father, and the child was
actually born at the mental hospital.154 When the boy developed
Huntington’s disease, a fatal, progressive, hereditary neurological
condition, the adoptive parents sued to recoup medical expenses in
excess of $80,000.155 The attorneys for the Burrs coined the term
“wrongful adoption,” labeling their initial pleading, “Complaint in
Fraud and Reimbursement of Expenses for Wrongful Adoption.”156
Mr. Burr testified at trial that he would never have adopted the
boy if he had known his biological parents were mental patients:
“If I had been handed the true facts and been given a right to make
up my mind, ‘cause all the woman would have had to said to me
was that the parents was in Massillon State Hospital and I would

adoptive parents concerning their child’s medical history”).
151. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109 (discussing the difference between failure
to inform inherent risks and deliberately misinforming potential adoptive parents
about a child’s health).
152. See id. (affirming the lowers court’s judgment in favor of the adoptive
parents).
153. See id. at 1103 (discussing the agency’s fraudulent statements).
154. See id. (discussing the contents of previously sealed records).
155. See id. (noting that the adoptive parents brought a civil suit against the
public adoption agency).
156. See Maley, supra note 127, at 710 n.9 (noting that the term had not be
used by any appellate court in the country before Burr).
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have never never seen this child.”157 Finding the elements of fraud
were met with the agency’s outright misrepresentations, the court
upheld the jury’s $125,000 verdict.158
While Burr involved deliberate misinformation, courts soon
began to recognize wrongful adoption when there was deliberate
concealment as well.159 In Juman v. Louise Wise Services,160 for
example, a New York adoption agency was sued for failing to
disclose to adoptive parents their child’s birth mother’s long
psychiatric history, including a lobotomy.161 They had not lied, like
the agency in Burr, but their failure to disclose what they knew led
to liability.162 Fraud is still the most common theory of liability in
wrongful adoption cases.163
b. Negligent Misrepresentation
Later courts recognized the tort of wrongful adoption not just
when agencies were deliberately deceptive, but also when they
157. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1106 n.3 (including Mr. Burr’s direct testimony
as a footnote in the opinion).
158. See id. at 1109 (affirming the lower’s court’s judgement for the adoptive
parents).
159. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 13 (noting that these claims
must still establish the elements of fraud).
160. 608 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1994).
161. See id. at 613–14 (discussing plaintiffs’ suit to recover damages for their
adoptive son’s medical treatment). For a deep dive into the sad history of Michael
Juman, see Lisa Belkins, What the Jumans Didn’t Know About Michael, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/14/magazine/what-the-jumans-didn-tknow-about-michael.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2019) (discussing Michael’s story
and his desire to learn more about his birth mother) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
162. See Juman, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 617 (noting that the agency had the
statutory obligation to disclose information about the child’s birth mother to the
adoptive parents); see also Michael J. v. L.A. Cty. Dep’t. of Adoptions, 201 Cal.
App. 3d 859, 863–64 (1988) (recognizing a cause of action for deliberate
concealment of the known fact that the child’s port-wine birthmark was a
symptom suggestive of a serious degenerative nerve disorder).
163. See D. Marianne Blair, A Closer Look at Theories of Liability:
Possibilities and Pitfalls, in JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, 2 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 16.03 (2015) (noting the prevalence of fraud in wrongful adoption suits
and explaining that the elements set forth in Burr are the elements used in most
jurisdictions).
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were negligent regarding information sharing.164 The first case to
move from fraud to negligence as the basis for the cause of action
was from Wisconsin.165 The agency falsely told prospective
adoptive parents that their child had no more risk of contracting
Huntington’s disease than any other child since his birth father
had tested negative for the disease, despite the fact his
grandmother had the disease.166 The family later learned that
there was no accurate test for Huntington’s disease, and when the
adopted child was diagnosed with Huntington’s, the parents sued
the agency for $10 million.167 The court was careful to note that the
agency’s liability was not because of a failure to learn about the
child’s condition, but rather, “CSS affirmatively misrepresented
Erin’s risk of developing Huntington's Disease. The agency
assumed the duty of informing the Meracles about Huntington’s
Disease and about Erin's chances of developing the disease.
Having voluntarily assumed this duty, . . . CSS negligently
breached it.”168 Thus, agencies could avoid liability under this legal
theory “by refraining from making any representations at
all . . . .”169 Remaining silent was not enough for liability
avoidance, however, as some courts began to impose an affirmative
164. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 16 (noting that
negligent agency conduct may have been just as harmful to adoptive parents as
purposeful deception); Gibeaut, supra note 140, at 35 (describing how a Montana
agency failed to inform adoptive parents that the child’s biological mother had
mental disabilities that required professional help). Courts have not gone so far
as to recognize wrongful adoption where the agency has failed to investigate a
child’s background. See Blair, supra note 163, § 16.03[2][b] (listing the elements
of negligent misrepresentation).
165. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 16 (discussing the
history of negligent adoption cases).
166. See Meracle v. Children’s Serv. Soc., 437 N.W.2d 532, 533 (Wis. 1989)
(describing the adoptive parent’s discussion with the agency’s social worker
regarding the child’s biological family’s history of Huntington’s Disease and the
child’s risk of developing the disease).
167. See id. (noting how the adoptive family discovered the truth about the
disease through a television program, the child’s subsequent diagnosis, and the
parent’s decision to sue the agency).
168. See id. at 537 (emphasizing that this case was unique because it did not
involve a duty to discover and disclose); see also M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs.,
475 N.W.2d 94, 96–100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the agency disclosed
incest in child’s background, but did so incompletely and thus negligently), rev’d
in part, aff’d in part, 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992).
169. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 16.
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duty to disclose information in the possession of the agency.170 In
Roe v. Catholic Charities,171 the agency incurred liability for failing
to disclose what they knew about serious behavioral problems
(including that one child had stomped to death a dog of a former
foster family).172
c. Damages
Wrongful adoption claims have resulted in significant money
damages under a number of different theories.173 The most
common recoveries are for extraordinary medical expenses that
adoptive parents have incurred and anticipate incurring in the
future because of the wrongful adoption.174 Also available are the
costs of travel, lodging, and special equipment associated with
medical care.175 Lost wages associated with increased care needs
are also recoverable.176 Damages for emotional distress and loss of
consortium have been successfully sought.177 One commentator
notes that damages for physical injury are available “if the adopted
170. See id. at 20 (noting that this approach was a shift).
171. 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
172. See id. at 356 (discussing the defendant agency’s knowledge of an
adoptive child’s destructive, violent behavior). In a similar vein, see Jackson v.
Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 40 (Mont. 1998) (describing the agency’s failure to disclose
an adopted child’s family history of mental illness); McKinney v. Washington, 950
P.2d 461, 465 (Wash. 1998) (discussing Washington state agency’s statutory duty
to disclose a potential adoptee’s relevant medical and social information).
173. See infra notes 174–183 and accompanying text (discussing the variety
of wrongful adoption claims).
174. See Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05 (acknowledging that courts have
“readily agreed such damages are compensable”).
175. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 25 (listing the variety of
damages that plaintiffs might seek in a wrongful adoption case).
176. See id. (stating that lost wages occur “when adoptive parents must
provide the extra care that a child needs”); Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05
(discussing various courts’ use of lost wages in the damages calculation).
177. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 25 (noting that some
jurisdictions only allow damages for emotional distress when the distress
manifests into physical ailments); Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05 (explaining that
adoptive parents often seek emotional distress damages, but noting the
limitations).
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child harms an adoptive parent or a sibling.”178 In Young v. Van
Duyne,179 the adoptive father sued the adoption agency for the
wrongful death of his wife, beaten to death with a baseball bat by
their adoptive son.180 Agencies have been liable for punitive
damages as well, where the agency acted wantonly and/or
willfully.181 When the adoption agency in Ross v. Louise Wise
Services, Inc.182 sought to strike a prayer for punitive damages in
a case involving their failure to disclose birth parents’ history of
schizophrenia, the court responded: “This court finds that, under
the facts presented, a jury could conclude that defendant’s acts
were ‘morally culpable’ or ‘actuated by evil or reprehensible
motives’ and that punitive damages are warranted to deter other
adoption agencies from engaging in similar acts of deceit in the
future.”183
Damages awarded can be significant.184 In one case, a jury
awarded $3.8 million for psychiatric care for the plaintiffs’ adult
daughter (though the court reduced the award to $200,000 because
of statutory limits imposed by a state tort reform statute.)185 A
California case included lifetime care for a psychiatric condition,
and resulted in a settlement for $1.45 million.186 In the
LEXISNEXIS database “Verdict & Settlement Analyzer,” a
handful of cases are reported for wrongful adoption, including

178. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 25.
179. 92 P.3d 1269 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
180. See id. at 1271 (noting that an adoptive father alleged that the adoption
agency knew or should have known that the adopted child was violent and in need
of therapeutic support).
181. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 25 (noting that this happens
in some jurisdictions); Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05174 (listing several instances
in which courts have awarded punitive damages).
182. 777 N.Y.S.2d 618 (2004).
183. See id. at 623 (denying the agency’s motion to dismiss the adoptive
parents’ demand for punitive damages).
184. See infra notes 185–188 (discussing instances in which courts have
awarded damages in the hundreds of thousands or even million dollar range).
185. See Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 n.4 (Mass. 1995)
(finding that this amount would “fairly and adequately compensate the
plaintiffs”).
186. See Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05 n.3 (describing Trial Brief, Forter v.
Cty. of San Mateo, No. 33207 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 6, 1992)).
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some stating simply that there was a confidential settlement.187
One case reports a recovery through jury verdict of $300,000.188
2. Legislatures Respond
As tort claims for wrongful adoption were recognized by
courts, legislatures also acted to mandate disclosures by adoption
agencies.189 The Texas statutes, for example, require the
preparation of a Health, Social, Educational, and Genetic History
Report by the placing entity and that it be provided to the
prospective adoptive parents “as early as practicable before the
first meeting of the adoptive parents with the child.”190 The statute
contains a long list of information that should be included in the
report, including birth and neonatal history; current physical
health; birth mother’s use of alcohol during pregnancy; family
relationships with siblings, birth parents and extended family;
educational performance and special education needs, if any;
physical, sexual or emotional abuse suffered by the child; and a
litany of information about birth parents, extended family and
siblings deemed “genetic history”:
(1) their health and medical history, including any genetic
diseases and disorders;
(2) their health status at the time of placement;
(3) the cause of and their age at death;
(4) their height, weight, and eye and hair color;
(5) their nationality and ethnic background;
187. See, e.g., Wallerstein v. Chandler, No. 85 17406-04, 2009 Jury Verdicts
LEXIS 135482 (settling for a confidential amount); Martin v. Methodist Home &
Newman, No. 90-07815-A, 2009 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 90435 (June 1994) (settling
for an undisclosed amount).
188. See Halper v. Jewish Family & Children’s Serv. of Greater Phila., 2009
Jury Verdicts LEXIS 198796 (March 2004) (listing the verdict); Halper v. Jewish
Family & Children’s Serv. of Greater Phila., 963 A.2d 1282, 1289 (Pa. 2009)
(reinstating the verdict).
189. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 33–34 (stating that
these statutes have been in place in most states since the 1980s and discussing
the content of the statutes).
190. TEX. FAM. CODE §162.005 (2017).
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(6) their general levels of educational and professional
achievements, if any;
(7) their religious backgrounds, if any;
(8) any psychological, psychiatric, or social evaluations,
including the date of the evaluation, any diagnosis, and a
summary of any findings;
(9) any criminal conviction records relating to a misdemeanor
or felony classified as an offense against the person or family or
public indecency or a felony violation of a statute intended to
control the possession or distribution of a substance included in
Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code; and
(10) any information necessary to determine whether the child
is entitled to or otherwise eligible for state or federal financial,
medical, or other assistance.191

The report is to be retained for ninety-nine years so that it can
be supplied not just to the adoptive parents, but also to adopted
persons on reaching adulthood as well as the children of adopted
persons.192 The statutes further provide that prospective adoptive
parents who indicate that they are interested in proceeding with
the adoption after reviewing the agency-prepared report may also
see the child’s case record, and the agency “shall provide the
prospective adoptive parents with access to research regarding
underlying health issues and other conditions of trauma that could
impact child development and permanency.”193 The Uniform
Adoption Act also mandates disclosure of a report about the
adoptee’s current physical and mental health, as well as
educational, social and genetic history.194 The comment to this
section describes the disclosure requirements as “the Act’s most
significant contributions to the improvement of contemporary
adoption practice.”195 The Act goes on to provide sanctions for
failure to disclose: civil penalties that “can be imposed against
191. Id. § 162.007(d).
192. See id. § 162.006 (mandating who does and does not have authority to
access to health records).
193. See id. § 162.0062 (c-1) (2017) (discussing the prospective adoptive
parents’ rights to information about the child during the adoption process).
194. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-106 (1994) (suggesting that the birth parents
provide this report as early as practicable and before the adoptive parent accepts
physical custody of the child).
195. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-106 cmt. (1994).
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agencies, lawyers, evaluators, and other providers of professional
services who fail to perform their responsibilities according to a
generally acceptable standard of care.”196 In addition to civil fines,
the Act acknowledges “wrongful adoption” causes of action: an
adoptive parent “may maintain an action for damages or equitable
relief against a person . . . who fails to perform the duties required
by” the disclosure sections of the Act.197
D. Agencies Respond to New Legal Risk
At least one adoption physician warned as early as 1937 that
withholding information about a child’s health and genetic risk “is
tantamount to fraud,” and that agencies would subject themselves
to professional liability for their failure to disclose.198 But without
a duty to disclose, legally acknowledged by tort liability for
wrongful adoption and imposed by legislatures via statutory
disclosure, agencies did not have the incentive to follow better
practices.199 Disclosure practices today have improved
considerably as agencies respond to the risk of legal liability:
“These rulings, accompanied by state statutes that variously
determine the extent and kind of medical histories that must be
collected and disclosed, have led adoption agencies subsequently to
become extremely conscious about the legal liability and ethical
ramifications of disclosure practices.”200 Organizations that offer

196. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 7-105 cmt. (1994).
197. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 7-105(c) (1994) (extending the availability of
damages for wrongful adoption to any person to whom the birth parents were
supposed to disclose information to under the Act).
198. See Sufian, supra note 106, at 102 (reviewing cases where adoptive
parents became disconcerted with their adopted child after learning of the child’s
family medical history).
199. See Maley, supra note 127, at 718 (arguing for legislative reform because
the traditional remedy of an annulment of the adoption had little deterrent effect
and was seldom used due to the harsh effects on the child).
200. See Sufian, supra note 106, at 122 (noting that the imposition of damages
as the remedy for wrongful adoption lawsuits increased awareness about the
issues caused by nondisclosure of pertinent information).
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education for agencies now emphasize the legal liability in failure
to disclose.201
“The possibility of being sued is . . . one of the factors affecting
agency behavior. The desire to minimize exposure to liability is a
constant reality.”202 Dr. Raleigh notes that the market focus of
adoption agencies has become more acute in the past decade as the
adoption marketplace has changed with reduced availability of the
babies and toddlers that adoption consumers were interested in
adopting.203 When adoption was booming, agencies “were less
interested in the financial considerations involved in sustaining a
small business . . . .these workers did not have to worry about
paying the rent or making payroll.”204 Now, with the downturn in
adoption, the focus has to shift—as one worker put it, “This is a
business, and we have to make business decisions.”205 Part of the
business decision-making has to be reducing litigation risk.206 The
need to avoid liability for wrongful adoption has already changed
agency practice with regard to information sharing.207 But there
201. See, e.g., Michele Jackson, Agency Liability: What Adoption Service
Providers and Families Need to Know, ADOPTION ADVOCATE NO. 73 (July 1, 2014),
http://www.adoptioncouncil.org/publications/2014/07/adoption-advocate-no-73
(last visited Apr. 23, 2019) (“An adoption agency may be found liable for false
statements or for not attempting to obtain information that and/or should have
been known.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Wrongful
Adoption Litigation and Practice, ADOPTIVE & FOSTER FAM. COALITION,
https://affcny.org/adoption/legal-issues/disclosure-of-information/wrongfuladoption-litigation-practice/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2019) (advising agencies on
avoiding liability) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
202. Schweitzer & Pollack, supra note 27, at 258.
203. See RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 4 (“[T]he number of children
available— especially overseastrickled to a halt.”); see also Dana E. Prescott &
Gary A. Debele, Shifting Ethical and Social Conundrums and “Stunningly
Anachronistic” Laws: What Lawyers in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction May
Want to Consider, 30 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 127, 141 (2017) (“Modern
adoption . . . cases present practitioners with particularly challenging ethical
dilemmas and liability risks.”).
204. See RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that, before this shift, many
adoption workers were drawn to the field because of their commitment to child
welfare).
205. See id. (stating that the cause of this change is due to new regulations
and a decrease in the number of young and healthy babies).
206. See Blair, supra note 150, at 855–56 (discussing the need for adoption
agencies to reduce risk since courts began to impose liability for failure on the
part of the agencies to provide essential information on the child’s history).
207. See Blair, supra note 163, § 16.03 (“Claims against adoption
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are other areas where wrongful agency practice persists.208 Other
theories of liability, subjecting agencies to litigation risk for
wrongful family separation, could incentivize better treatment of
birth parents.209 This Article now turns to exploration of that
potential liability.
IV. Legal Liability for Wrongful Family Separation
Tort law is our primary fallback method of empowering
ordinary people to remedy injustices to themselves through
their courts.
—Jack B. Weinstein 210

There is no named tort of wrongful family separation as yet,
but there are a number of potential causes of action to address
agencies who defraud birth parents or interfere with parental
rights.211 Procuring consent to adoption by fraud, duress or
coercion could create a cause of action similar to the fraud and
misrepresentation actions in wrongful adoption.212 Infliction of
intermediaries seeking damages for misconduct in the disclosure of health-related
information have been brought under a variety of legal theories.”).
208. See Jennifer Emmaneel, Note, Beyond Wrongful Adoption: Expanding
Adoption Agency Liability to Include a Duty to Investigate and a Duty to Warn, 29
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 181, 181–83 (1999) (outlining adoption agency’s liability
for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations and failures to investigate
possible issues with the child’s medical background).
209. See Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’
Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 526–39
(2005) (advocating agency best practices in adoption procedures to ensure
informed consent from biological mothers by providing counseling services,
reducing conflicts of interest, and encouraging legal representation for the
biological parents).
210. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for
the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 243
(2008).
211. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1994) (recognizing fraud and
intentional misconduct as causes of action in the adoption context).
212.See In re Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1078 (Ohio 1996) (stating that a
biological parent’s consent is not voluntary, and thus not valid, if given under
duress or coercion).
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emotional distress causes of action also seem applicable.213 And
several courts have recognized the tort of interference with
parental rights in cases of adoption.214 Attorneys who facilitate
adoptions might also be subjected to liability for legal malpractice
or other wrongdoing.215 Finally, states may wish to adopt a new
cause of action for wrongful family separation.216
A. Fraud and Misrepresentation217
Fraud corrupts whatever it touches—the dishonesty involved in
fraud simply cannot be condoned.
—Saul Litvinoff218

In adoption, “consents may be set aside in all jurisdictions for
fraud, duress, or undue influence.”219 As one court put it,
213. See Ross v. Louise Wise Servs., 868 N.E.2d 189, 191 (N.Y. 2007)
(acknowledging that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress can exist in wrongful adoption cases, although here it was barred by the
statute of limitations).
214. See Coward v. Wellmont Health Sys., 812 S.E.2d 766, 770–71 (Va. 2018)
(outlining a four-factor test for intentional interference with parental rights in
the adoption context); Jenkins v. Miller, No. 2:12-cv-184, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
160793, at *27 (D. Vt. Sept. 29, 2017) (“[T]ortious interference with parental
rights constitutes a cause of action cognizable in this state.”).
215. See Prescott & Debele, supra note 203, at 131 (noting that adoption
lawyers increasingly face substantial risk).
216. See Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Stefan A. Reisenfeld Symposium 2002:
Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
213, 218–19 (2003) (discussing the right to keep the family together as a
recognized right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international treaties).
217. Fraud encompasses a wide variety of deceitful and false conduct. It may
encompass both intentional and negligent misrepresentation. See Frank J.
Cavico, Fraudulent, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation in the
Employment Context: The Deceitful, Careless, and Thoughtless Employer, 20
CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (noting that misrepresentation can be categorized
as intentional fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
careless misrepresentation, or innocent misrepresentation).
218. Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue
on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 66 (1989).
219. Samuels, supra note 209, at 512; see KATHERINE G. THOMPSON & JOAN H.
HOLLINGER, 2 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02 (2015) (discussing the rights of
adoptive parents, biological parents, and stepparents to set aside adoption in the
event of defective consent).
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The Private Adoption Act of 1979 does not provide for any
method whereby the act of surrender may be set aside because
of vitiated consent. However, the executed act of surrender,
although highly regulated and specialized, is in essence a
contract, namely an agreement by two or more parties whereby
obligations are created, modified, or extinguished. Accordingly,
as in other agreements, the consent necessary to the surrender
of a child for private adoption may be vitiated by error, fraud or
duress.220

When fraud induces consent, “though consent has come into
existence, it is impaired, defective, it is tainted by a vice that
affects its freedom.”221 In order for consent to adoption to be valid,
it must be voluntary.222 The same kind of fraud that should lead to
invalidation of consent could serve as the basis of a fraud
lawsuit.223
Even when the consent is invalid because of fraud or duress,
courts are extremely reluctant to order the child removed from the
adoptive parent and returned to the biological parent:
Most jurisdictions will not allow a revocation to halt an adoption
proceeding automatically if the adoptive parents oppose the
revocation, even though the notice of revocation met all the
statutory requirements. Instead, the attempted withdrawal of
consent will trigger a hearing to determine whether the
statutory grounds exist for an involuntary termination of
parental rights, to the text of the note or whether a return of

220. See In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1007–08 (La. 1988) (discussing whether
the eighteen-year-old birth mother’s family’s refusal to allow her to bring the baby
home was akin to duress, vitiating the mother’s consent to relinquish her parental
rights).
221. Litvinoff, supra note 218, at 6.
222. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 150 (“Relinquishment of parental rights
and consent to adoption must be knowingly and voluntarily given.”); Samuels,
supra note 209, at 511 (noting that a widely-accepted goal of infant adoption is to
ensure that the birth parents’ decisions are deliberate); 2 AM. JUR. 2D, Adoption
§ 23, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019) (noting that voluntary consent is
jurisdictional).
223. See Harriet Dinegar Milks, Annotation, “Wrongful Adoption” Causes of
Action Against Adoption Agencies Where Children Have or Develop Mental or
Physical Problems That Are Misrepresented or Not Disclosed to Adoptive Parents,
74 A.L.R. 5th Art. 1 (1999) (discussing influential wrongful adoption cases where
the causes of action were grounded in the elements of fraud).
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the child to the biological parents is in the best interests of the
child.224

The case of J.M.P. illustrates the need for a cause of action for
money damages in adoption cases.225 Though the birth mother
validly withdrew her consent to the adoption within the thirty days
permitted by statute, that did not guarantee the return of her
child.226 The court simply stated, “the withdrawal of consent will
not prevent the adoption if the adoption is found to be in the best
interests of the child.”227
A classic case of fraud in the inducement of consent in the
adoption context is Vela v. Marywood.228 Corina, age nineteen and
unmarried, approached an adoption agency when she discovered
she was pregnant.229 Corina was a college student, and was
described by the appellate court as “an exemplary young woman”
from “a strong, stable, and supportive family.”230 When receiving
counseling from Marywood, a child-placing agency, Corina was
adamant that she wanted open adoption231 and Marywood said it
was able to provide that for her.232 Marywood offered, as a standard
224. THOMPSON & HOLLINGER, supra note 219, § 8.02(1)(a)(i).
225. See In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1007–08 (acknowledging that the only
remedy available for an act of surrender made under duress is to set aside the act
and remove the child from the adoptive parents’ custody if removal is in the child’s
best interests).
226. See id. at 1021 (Calogero, J., dissenting) (“[The biological mother] did in
fact revoke her consent to the surrender within thirty days of signing the act.”).
227. See id. at 1014 (noting the court’s preference for consideration of the
child’s best interests in adoption proceedings).
228. See Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that the adoption agency owed to the biological mother a duty to disclose and was
bound to act in good faith in regards to her interests).
229. See id. at 753 (“In September 1997, Corina, then nineteen years of age
and unmarried, learned she was pregnant.”).
230. See id. (discussing Corina’s educational accomplishments, volunteer
experience, and family background).
231. See id. (noting that Corina expressed the type of couple she wanted her
unborn child would go to and her desire to maintain a relationship with the child
after adoption). “Open adoption,” also known as post-adoption contact, can
include any number of different kinds of contact, from anonymously-shared
letters and photographs throughout the child’s lifetime to occasional-to-frequent
in-person visits. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 151 (acknowledging that the
amount of contact a biological parent may have with the child through an open
adoption agreement varies by state).
232. See Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 753 (“Corina reported . . . that she had bonded
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practice, a “sharing plan,” where adoptive parents agree to allow
the birth mother to visit the child after the termination of her
parental rights.233 The arrangement is, however, an “empty
promise,” as Marywood admitted, since it is wholly
unenforceable.234 Marywood failed to mention the unenforceable
nature of the agreement.235 That “empty promise” was
compounded by statements made by her counselor shortly after the
baby’s birth at the hospital that Corina “’would always be able to
visit her baby’ and that her baby would always know that Corina
was his mother.”236 Corina cried throughout that visit.237
When Corina tried to withdraw her consent to adoption and
regain possession of her child, the agency refused.238 The trial court
with her unborn child . . . and discussed what Marywood terms an ‘open
adoption.’”).
233. See id. at 754 (“A sharing plan ostensibly allows the birth mother to
select the adoptive family, visit her child on a regular basis after the adoption,
and exchange letters and pictures.”).
234. See id. (noting that while the adoptive parents agree in writing to
conform to the arrangement, the birth mother does not sign the agreement, so
neither the adoptive parents nor Marywood are in an agreement with the birth
mother).
235. See id. (“[T]he executive director of Marywood admits that the sharing
plan is an ‘empty promise.’”). As I explained in a previous article, “it is common
practice in states without enforceable open-adoption agreements, however, for
agencies and adoptive parents to enter into such unenforceable ‘agreements.’”
Seymore, supra note 7, at 152. I reviewed agency websites in states where open
adoption agreements are not enforceable and found many promises of continuing
contact. See id. (“The birth parents may not be aware that the openness promised
by these agencies may not be legally binding.”). One agency, for example,
promised much like Marywood: “arrangements can be made with the assistance
of Spirit of Faith Adoptions to stay in touch with your child’s adoptive parents
throughout his/her lifetime.” Id. at 152. The websites were all silent on the fact
that no such agreements were legally enforceable in their jurisdictions. See id. at
152–53 (discussing that, even where open adoption agreements are enforceable
in a certain state, the adoption agency websites failed to disclose that such
agreements have complex legal requirements to make them judicially
enforceable).
236. See Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 755 (noting that the counselor made similar
statements in a meeting shortly after the child’s birth promising Corina that she
would always be in the child’s life).
237. See id. (discussing the one and a half hour visit where Corina ultimately
signed a temporary foster-care request).
238. See id. at 756 (discussing a phone call where Corina claims she told her
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upheld the adoption, and Corina appealed.239 The appellate court
found fraud.240 The agency committed fraud because of its failure
to disclose the unenforceability of the open adoption agreement.241
Marywood “owed Corina a duty of complete disclosure when
discussing adoption procedures, including any proposed
post-adoption plan.”242 The agency had an obligation to fully
disclose “the whole truth” about the open-adoption agreement,
including the fact that it was not binding.243 Further, the court
held, the agency held a position of superiority and influence over
the birth mother who placed special confidence in them “by virtue
of the counseling relationship.”244 The court noted the vulnerability
of “a young unmarried mother considering placement of her child
for adoption,” entitled her to a “‘higher obligation’ when she
confides in a maternity counselor.”245
Corina’s case is unusual in one respect (the fraud was
unfortunately typical)—the court concluded that the fraud vitiated
her consent, and that she was, therefore, entitled to return of her
child.246 In another jurisdiction, return of the child might well have
been blocked by a “best interest of the child” analysis247 that
privileged the fact that the child had been with the prospective

counselor “she wanted [her] baby back” and had “changed [her] mind”).
239. See id. at 752 (noting that the termination order was placed before
Corina’s counsel could intervene and Corina appealed the district court’s
judgment).
240. See id. at 765 (concluding that the adoption agency owed the expectant
mother a high standard of care which it did not uphold when it did not disclose
the unenforceability of the open adoption agreement).
241. See id. at 754 (stating that even the executive director of Marywood that
the open adoption agreement is essentially an empty promise).
242. Id. at 761.
243. See id. (emphasizing that the birth mother placed special confidence in
the adoption agency).
244. See id. at 765 (stating that this higher standard applies as soon as the
expectant mother undertakes counseling with the adoption service).
245. Id. at 761.
246. See id. at 765 (finding that, because the relinquishment waiver was not
voluntarily signed by the mother, her parental rights were never terminated).
247. See THOMPSON & HOLLINGER, supra note 219, § 8.02(1)(a)(i) (discussing
situations where the biological parents revoke consent to the adoption within the
statutory requirements, but the court will still require a “best interests” hearing
to determine whether the biological parents can regain custody of the child).
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adoptive parents for two years during the course of the litigation.248
In such a jurisdiction, the adoption agency should face legal
liability and money damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.249
“Fraud consists [of] deception practiced in order to induce
another to part with property or surrender some legal right.”250
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact,
opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to
act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to
liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him
by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.251

The well-established elements of a fraud cause of action are as
follows: “(1) a false representation; (2) in reference to a material
fact; (3) made with knowledge of its falsity; (4) with the intent to
deceive; and (5) on which an action is taken in justifiable reliance
upon the representation.”252
As the court in Vela noted, an adoption agency serving
vulnerable women at a point of crisis owes a duty easily breached
when seeking to secure consent to adoption.253 False promises of
continued contact amounted to fraud.254 Promising the birth
248. See Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (stating
that Texas law requires a relinquishment affidavit and a finding that termination
is in the best interest of the child before the court terminates parental rights).
The court notes that though “the child is now two years of age and has spent
almost his entire life with the prospective adoptive parents . . . any fault lies with
the pace of the legal system and not with the mother,” and ordered return of the
child. Id at 765.
249. See infra notes 274–278 (discussing the loss of or interference with
parental rights as being appropriate for an award of money damages).
250. Reid v. Landsberger, 123 Conn. App. 260, 281 (2010).
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
252. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 24, Westlaw (database updated Feb.
2019).
253. See Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 761 (emphasizing that the adoption agency’s
position of superiority and influence over the young, biological mother placed
upon the agency a duty to act in good faith in regard to the mother’s interests).
254. See id. (noting that the adoption agency owed, yet failed to perform, a
duty of full disclosure to the biological mother, including a duty to explain that
the continued contact agreement was not legally enforceable). Courts have
reached similar results when the birth father consents after false promises of
continuing contact were made. See, e.g., In re Interest of S.A.B., No. 04-01-00795,
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mother that the child would be placed with her cousin constituted
fraud.255 In Huebert v. Marshall,256 the birth mother was deceived
by a woman who was emotionally involved with the baby’s father
into consenting to an adoption.257 The mother did not know that
the woman and the baby’s father had planned to get together after
the father left her.258
In In re Cheryl E.,259 the court found fraud where the adoption
worker falsely told the mother that if she signed the
relinquishment she could have the child returned to her within one
year if she wished, but that if she did not sign, the child would be
given to her estranged husband and his girlfriend.260 The court
noted that the agency’s intent to defraud the mother was evident
from the fact that the worker made false representations with the
knowledge that the mother would rely on them, regardless of
whether the worker knew they were actually false.261 The worker
2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5053, at *9 (Tex. App. July 17, 2002) (“[F]raudulent
representations made to a party to induce the party into executing an affidavit of
relinquishment constitute extrinsic fraud.”); Queen v. Goeddertz, 48 S.W.3d 928,
932 (Tex. App. 2001) (noting that an affidavit of relinquishment will be considered
involuntary if procured by fraud).
255. See Jones v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 85 S.W.3d 483,
491 (Tex. App. 2002) (noting that the Department promised the birth mother that
her cousin would care for the child and she would be able to see the child where,
in reality, the Department gave the child to strangers and the birth mother had
no right to visit the child (citing Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. App.
2000))).
256. 270 N.E.2d 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971).
257. See id. at 467 (discussing the woman’s representations to the birth
mother that the adoptive parents were good people and would make good parents
despite the fact that the woman had only casually spoken with the adoptive
parents). The court noted that the woman “was acting in a fiduciary capacity
because of [the biological mother]’s total trust in her,” and “violated that trust
because she was secretly involved with [the biological mother]’s husband.” Id.
258. See id. at 465 (discussing the timeline of events following the birth of the
child, specifically that the biological mother was aware her husband was planning
to leave her, but she did not know he would do so with the woman persuading her
to give her child up for adoption).
259. 161 Cal. App. 3d 587, 599 (1984).
260. See id. at 596–99 (affirming the trial court’s finding that the adoption
worker either explicitly told the mother she could have her daughter returned to
her or made statements causing the mother to reasonably believe she had a year
to change her mind).
261. See id. at 599 (“[R]epresentations need not be made with knowledge of
actual falsity, but need only be a false assertion of fact by one who has no
reasonable grounds for believing his own statements to be true, and made with
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had “no reasonable grounds for believing his own statements to be
true,” and were made with the intent to induce the mother to
consent.262 The mother justifiably relied on the agency’s
representations, to her detriment.263
Courts have also held that “undue influence and overreaching
are species of fraud and will vitiate a transaction,” and found fraud
where the birth mother was overwhelmed by the agency and
over-persuaded to consent.264 One court noted the following factors
characterize undue influence and over-persuasion: “(1) Discussion
and consummation of the transaction in an unusual place; (2)
insistent demand that the business be finished at once; (3) extreme
emphasis on untoward consequences of delay; and (4) absence of
third party advisors to the servient party.”265 So where adoption
was first suggested by the unwed mother’s doctor who shared her
Adventist faith and who called an Adventist adoption agency in
another state for her, and where she moved to that other state at
the behest of the agency and was surrounded by Adventist church
members who worked to get her to consent to adoption, the court
found undue influence.266 In another case, after the mother decided
to keep her child, the maternity home embarked on a course of
intent to induce the other to alter his position, to his injury.”).
262. See id. (noting that it is irrelevant whether the adoption worker knew or
believed the mother had one year to change her mind and reclaim her child).
263. See id. at 600 (“Implicit in the trial court’s finding that [the mother]
relinquished her child for adoption as a result of fraud is the inference that she
would not have relinquished her child but for the fraud.”).
264. See Sorentino v. Family & Children’s Soc., 367 A.2d 1168, 1169 (N.J.
1976) (finding the adoption agency exerted unwarranted pressure on the mother
when an adoption worker threatened her with harassment and litigation if she
did not relinquish parental rights); Methodist Mission Home v. N.A.B., 451
S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. App. 1970) (noting that the adoption agency “subjected [the
mother] to an intensive campaign, extending over a five-day period, designed to
convince her to give up her baby”); In re Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 178, 180
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (finding undue influence where every time the mother
expressed uncertainty about giving up her child, the adoption agency provided
counseling to encourage her to sign the relinquishment papers).
265. See In re Cheryl E., 161 Cal. App. 3d at 601 (relying on factors to find
undue influence because direct evidence of it is rarely obtainable).
266. See In re Perry, 641 P.2d at 181 (“[T]his environment created in [the
mother’s] mind an obligation, without option, to repay the agency’s expenses by
relinquishing her rights to her child.”).

ADOPTING CIVIL DAMAGES

937

conduct to persuade her to relinquish the child for adoption.267 She
was told that she was being selfish, and had no right to keep the
child.268 She was advised that the child would be a burden to her
and that she would find it difficult to secure a husband, and that if
she did find a husband, he would resent the child.269 The worker
asked her “what [she] would do when, some day in the future, her
son returned home from school and asked, ‘Mommy, what’s a
bastard?’”270 The mother testified that the interviews happened
over a five day period immediately after the birth of her child, and
that the period was a “nightmare” where she was only sleeping
three hours a night.271 The court noted “the fact that an unwed
mother who has just given birth is usually emotionally distraught
and peculiarly vulnerable to efforts, well-meaning or
unscrupulous, to persuade her to give up her child.”272
All of the cases discussed above, where the court found fraud,
led to rescission of consent.273 But the facts and law of these cases
267. See Methodist Mission Home, 451 S.W.2d at 541 (discussing the Home’s
counseling policy to encourage unwed women to give up their children rather than
to discuss their options).
268.See id. at 542 n.7 (detailing the conversations between the mother and the
adoption worker where the adoption worker tried to persuade the mother to give
her child up for adoption).
269. See id. (noting that the adoption worker told the mother she was
unaware of any unwed mother happy with her decision to keep her child).
270.See id. (discussing one counseling session where the adoption worker told the
mother a story about another unwed mother whose child asked her the meaning
of “bastard”).
271. See id. at 543–44 (“She testified that, as a result of her discussions with
[the adoption worker], she felt ‘trapped,’ and that . . . she consented to the
adoption of her child to avoid ‘harassment.’”).
272. Id. at 544.
273. See Sorentino, 367 A.2d at 1170 (stating that the trial judge had
sufficient evidence for his finding that the agency coerced the mother into
relinquishing her child after she expressed her desire to keep the child); Vela v.
Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 764 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding the relinquishment
affidavit void because the mother signed it based on misrepresentations by the
agency that she would have an enforceable open adoption agreement with the
adoptive parents); Methodist Mission Home, 451 S.W.2d at 544 (concluding that
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the adoption agency exercised
undue influence over the mother when she executed agreements to surrender
custody of her newborn child); In re Perry, 641 P.2d at 181 (noting that the undue
influence by the adoption agency was exacerbated by the fact that the expectant
mother spent the last months of her pregnancy completely surrounded by and in
the care of the agency).
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also support the kind of fraud that gives rise to civil liability for
damages.274 But how would damages be calculated in such cases?
“Proof of damages is essential in an action for fraud or deceit, and
generally, the loss or injury must be a pecuniary injury or an
economic loss. However, it is generally sufficient if the fraud has
resulted in the loss of a right which the law recognizes as of
pecuniary value.”275 The right of parenthood is clearly a right
which the law recognizes as of pecuniary value.276 Cases of tortious
interference with parental rights lead to pecuniary damages,277 as
do cases involving the wrongful death of a child.278 Further, many
frauds in the adoption context involve breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by the agency or adoption workers, and “in some
jurisdictions, a cause of action may be made for a breach of
fiduciary duty even without actual damages or the showing of an
economic loss.” 279 And fraudulent inducement cases are not subject
to the economic loss doctrine. 280 Indeed, in some jurisdictions “a
274. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 346, Westlaw (database updated
Feb. 2019) (“Because fraud of all kinds is abhorrent to the law, if one person is
injured by the fraud of another, the courts have jurisdiction to afford a proper
remedy.”).
275. Id. § 266.
276. See McCurdy v. Dodd, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2333, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
28, 2000) (bringing a claim for pecuniary damages for loss of parenthood against
the police officers who shot and killed her child).
277. See infra note 278 (discussing parents’ claims for damages after the loss
of their child).
278. See 10 PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 45.08[11]
(stating that the measure of damage in wrongful death of a child includes “the
parents’ loss of the pecuniary value of the child’s earnings and services during
minority, less the cost of maintaining the child during that period, plus
contributions reasonably to be expected after the child reaches majority”).
“However, some courts have not permitted the expense of rearing and educating
the child to be used as a setoff, and other courts have limited the loss for the death
of a minor to the period of the child’s minority.” Id.; see also Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 466 (Wis. 1980) (holding that parents of an injured child can
recover punitive damages incident to their action for compensatory damages).
279. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit, § 268, Westlaw (database updated
Feb. 2019) (stating that the requirement to show actual damages sustained from
fraudulent actions may vary by jurisdiction).
280. See id. § 270 (“[C]laims for the tort of fraudulent inducement are not
barred by the economic loss doctrine.”); R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of
Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent
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non-compensable violation of a legally protected right” 281 is enough
to trigger nominal damages, and once nominal damages are
awarded, punitive damages are supported. 282 Fraud can also give
rise to non-economic damages, including emotional distress.283
Fraud actions can give rise to punitive damages.284 Where
there is a fiduciary duty, “punitive damages can be awarded when
the defendant violates a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff.”285 In
cases where the courts describe the vulnerable state of birth
mothers, and their reliance on adoption agencies and workers, they
Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1803–11 (2000)
(discussing the applicability of the economic loss rule to fraud claims in various
jurisdictions, noting that several jurisdictions find fraudulent inducement claims
to be in conflict with the economic loss doctrine).
281. See 37 AM JUR 2D, supra note 274, § 269 (noting that recovery for fraud
requires more than a showing of nominal damages); First Bank of Boaz v. Fielder,
590 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala. 1991) (“Punitive damages may be awarded by the jury
in a fraud action if the plaintiff makes a sufficient evidentiary showing that he
has been injured as a result of the fraud and that the defendant’s conduct
warrants punishment.”).
282. See AM JUR 2D, Damages, § 570, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019)
(observing that once actual damages, even nominal damages, are established,
some jurisdictions may award punitive damages it is a proper case to do so);
Fielder, 590 So. 2d at 898 (finding that although the jury’s award of punitive
damages to the plaintiffs was not accompanied by nominal or compensatory
damages, this was not grounds to set aside the verdict because there was
sufficient evidence that the plaintiffs were harmed, at least nominally, by the
defendant’s fraudulent acts).
283. See Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud
Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1, 31 (1989)
(“Rather than ignoring the claims of fraud plaintiffs who have suffered
substantial frustration or severe emotional distress, courts should recognize that
fraud is at least in part a dignitary tort and should award damages for that
distress.”); Steven J. Gaynor, Annotation, Fraud Actions: Right to Recover for
Mental or Emotional Distress, 11 A.L.R. 5th 88 (1995) (noting that some courts
have held that a wrongdoer should be held liable for all the “ordinary, natural,
and proximate consequences of his actions,” including those that caused the
plaintiff “shame, humiliation, and mental anguish”); see, e.g., McGhee v. McGhee,
353 P.2d 760, 764 (Idaho 1960) (noting that plaintiff could recover damages for
humiliation, disgrace, and mental anguish in husband’s failure to disclose he was
already married).
284. See 4 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 40.03 (“Most jurisdictions impose
punitive damages for conduct that evinces malice, fraud, oppression, or willful
and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others.”); 1-9 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
§ 9.7 (“Generally, the court will award punitive damages in fraud cases if the
plaintiff shows that the defendant committed the misrepresentation with a
malicious or willful intent.”).
285. 1-9 PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 9.7.
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are using language of fiduciary duty: “courts regularly impose
fiduciary obligations ad hoc in relationships where one person
trusts another and becomes vulnerable to harm as a result.”286
B. Tortious Interference with Parental Rights
In a previous article, I noted that thwarted birth fathers had
had some success in bringing lawsuits for tortious interference
with parental rights.287 Such a cause of action could be brought by
birth mothers and birth fathers alike. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts describes the cause of action as follows: “One who, with
knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts, or otherwise
compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled
to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left
him, is subject to liability to the parent.”288 The elements of the
cause of action require that: (1) the parent has a legal right to a
parental relationship with the child; (2) the other party abducted
the child or compelled the child to leave the parent’s custody; (3)
such action was willful; and (4) the action was done with notice or
knowledge that the parent did not consent.289
Cases of adoption where a parent appears to have consented
to the adoption do not facially look to satisfy the final element of
the tort.290 But where consent was adduced by fraud, duress,
286. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2002) (discussing the typical characteristics of
relationships upon which courts typically impose fiduciary duties).
287. See Malinda L. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood in Abortion and
Adoption, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 861 (2017) (noting that fathers have succeeded
in their claims for tortious interference with parental rights where the birth
mother never informed the father that she was pregnant with his child, depriving
him of the opportunity to assert his parental rights).
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
289. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 113 (Supp. 2018) (providing the
four elements necessary to establish a claim of tortious interference with child
custody); see, e.g., Wolf v. Wolf, 690 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Iowa 2005) (same); Wyatt
v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 563–64 (Va. 2012) (recognizing a cause of action
for tortious interference with parental rights for the first time under Virginia
law).
290. See Wyatt, 725 S.E.2d at 556 (clarifying that the facts of this case arose
from an unauthorized adoption).
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coercion, or undue influence, that consent is void.291 As one
adoption law expert notes, “a finding that a consent is invalid is
equivalent to a finding that there was never any consent at all.”292
In two cases involving birth fathers, courts recognized that the
tort applied to their adoption cases.293 In Kessel, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals approved significant damages.294 In
both cases the birth mothers, together with adoption agencies
and/or adoption attorneys, sought to hide the birth and location of
the child despite knowing that the birth fathers intended to assert
an interest in parenting.295 In Wyatt v. McDermott,296 John Wyatt’s
child was placed for adoption without his knowledge or consent.297
In fact, the birth mother, at the urging of an adoption attorney,
made false statements to John about her intentions regarding
adoption and her due date so that he would not try to prevent the
291. See Samuels, supra note 209, at 512 (“As a general rule, consents may be
aside in all jurisdictions for fraud, duress, or undue influence, usually for a limited
period of time after consent has been given or after the adoption has been
granted.”).
292. KATHERINE G. THOMPSON & JOAN H. HOLLINGER, 2 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8.02 (Victor Dorff ed., 1991).
293. See Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 765 (W. Va. 1998) (“[W]e hold that
a parent may maintain a cause of action against one who tortuously interferes
with a parent’s parental or custodial relationship with [his] minor child.”); see also
Wyatt, 725 S.E.2d at 563–64 (recognizing a cause of action for tortious
interference with parental rights for the first time under Virginia law).
294.See Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 819 (upholding a jury award of $2 million in
compensatory damages and $5.85 million in punitive damages). Wyatt reached a
confidential settlement.
295. See id. at 734–39 (noting that the father of the unborn child “opposed any
adoption” and subsequently sought legal advice regarding his parental rights as
the child’s biological father); see also Wyatt, 725 S.E.2d at 556–57 (explaining that
the father accompanied the mother to multiple doctors’ appointments and “made
plans with [the mother] to raise their child together”). In a case with strikingly
similar facts to Kessel, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized a cause of action
for a birth father who alleged conspiracy to interfere with parental rights, though
the court did not describe it as a case of tortious interference with parental rights.
See Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490, 497 (Miss. 1998) (recognizing that the father
had a “constitutional right to be notified of or to withhold his consent to the
adoption of his child” in light of his efforts to establish a relationship with the
child).
296. 725 S.E.2d 555 (Va. 2012).
297. See id. at 557 (certifying two questions to the Virginia Supreme Court by
the federal district court where John Wyatt filed actions against the adoption
attorney and adoption agency for tortious interference with the parental
relationship).
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adoption.298 The birth mother went into labor two weeks early and
even concealed the fact that she was in labor when she spoke to
John on the phone.299 Prospective adoptive parents from Utah
traveled to Virginia to take custody of the child and traveled back
to Utah.300 John, not knowing of the adoption plans or that the
child was in Utah, took steps in Virginia to establish paternity and
filed in the Virginia putative father registry.301 The prospective
adoptive parents filed their petition for adoption in Utah, their
state of residence.302 Although the Virginia Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court granted John custody of Baby E.Z.,303 the Utah
Supreme Court held that he had not strictly complied with the
Utah adoption statutes and thus could not block the adoption.304
John then brought suit in federal court in Virginia against the
Utah adoption attorneys and adoption agency that facilitated the
adoption.305 The federal court certified the question to the Virginia
Supreme Court of whether Virginia recognized a cause of action for
tortious interference with parental relationships.306 The Virginia
Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for tortious
interference with parental rights.307 The court noted the
298. See id. (“[The mother] continued to assure Wyatt that she still planned
to raise the baby with him.”).
299. See id. (“[The child] was born two weeks early . . . and Wyatt was not
informed of the birth.”).
300. See In re Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 705 (Utah 2011) (noting that the
prospective parents obtained appropriate agency approval to travel back to Utah
with Baby E.Z.).
301. See id. (acknowledging that Wyatt initiated custody and visitation
proceedings in a Virginia juvenile and domestic relations court the day after the
prospective parents received travel approval).
302. See id. (clarifying that the Petition for Adoption in the Utah district court
was filed “while the Virginia custody and visitation action was proceeding”).
303. See id. (finding exclusive jurisdiction to determine the custody of baby
E.Z. from reliance on the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)).
304. See id. (determining “that . . . Wyatt waived his rights to the child, that
he could not intervene, and that his consent to the adoption was not required”
because of his failure to raise a challenge to the PKPA or to the Utah court’s
jurisdiction to hear the adoption proceeding).
305. Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 556 (Va. 2012).
306. See id. at 556 (“[A]nd, if so, what elements constitute such a tort.”).
307. See id. at 564 (answering the district court’s first certified question in the
affirmative).
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importance of the parent–child relationship and recognized “the
essential value” of protecting a parent’s right to form a relationship
with his or her child.308 Flowing from that right, then, was “a cause
of action against third parties who seek to interfere with this
right.”309 The court had strong words condemning the actions of the
birth mother, the adoption agency, and the attorneys in this case.
It is both astonishing and profoundly disturbing that in this
case, a biological mother and her parents, with the aid of two
licensed attorneys and an adoption agency, could intentionally
act to prevent a biological father—who is in no way alleged to
be an unfit parent—from legally establishing his parental
rights and gaining custody of a child whom the mother did not
want to keep, and that this father would have no recourse in the
law. The facts as pled indicate that the Defendants went to
great lengths to disguise their agenda from the biological father,
including preventing notice of his daughter’s birth and hiding
their intent to have an immediate out-of-state adoption, in order
to prevent the legal establishment of his own parental rights.
This Court has long recognized that the rights of an unwed
father are deserving of protection . . . . The tort of tortious
interference with parental rights may provide one means of
such protection. Finally, we hope that the threat of a civil action
would help deter third parties such as attorneys and adoption
agencies from engaging in the sort of actions alleged to have
taken place.310

The court recognized that available damages included “both
tangible and intangible damages, including compensatory
damages for the expenses incurred in seeking the recovery of the
child, lost services, lost companionship, and mental anguish.”311
308. See id. at 558 (“[R]ejecting tortious interference with parental rights as
a legitimate cause of action would leave a substantial gap in the legal protection
afforded to the parent-child relationship.”).
309. Id. at 558.
310. Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted).
311. Id. at 563. According to the Restatement,
The parent can recover for the loss of society of his child and for his
emotional distress resulting from its abduction or enticement. If there
has been a loss of service or if the child, though actually not performing
service, was old enough to do so, the parent can recover for the loss of
the service that he could have required of the child during the period
of its absence. He is also entitled to recover for any reasonable expenses
incurred by him in regaining custody of the child and for any
reasonable expenses incurred or likely to be incurred in treating or
caring for the child if it has suffered illness or other bodily harm as a
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The Wyatt court further noted that punitive damages would
also be available under this tort.312 In Kessel v. Leavitt,313 the
appellants—the birth mother, her parents, and her brother (who
happened to be an attorney)—sought to challenge a West Virginia
circuit court’s finding of tortious interference with the biological
father’s parental rights.314 The jury in the lower court awarded the
father $2 million in compensatory damages and $5.85 million in
punitive damages.315
C. Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Once the American Law Institute recognized an independent
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in 1948’s
publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, states followed
suit.316 Most jurisdictions have now recognized the existence of an

result of the defendant’s tortious conduct.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 cmt. g. (AM. LAW INST.1977); see also Dale
Margolin Cecka, Terminating Parental Rights Through a Backdoor in the
Virginia Code: Adoptions Under Section 63.2–1202(H), 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 371,
410 (2013) (“Potential damages for tortious interference with parental rights
include not only the cost of securing the parent’s rights but also mental anguish
and lost companionship.”).
312. See Wyatt, 725 S.E.2d at 563 (“If a tortfeasor’s tort was
intentional . . . and if the evidence is sufficient to support an award of
compensatory damages, the victim’s right to punitive damages and the quantum
thereof are jury questions.” (citing Smith v. Litten, 507 S.E.2d 77, 80 (Va. 1998))).
313. 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).
314. Id. at 734. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
dismissed the cause of action against the birth mother because her equal custody
rights meant that she could not tortuously interfere with the father’s rights. See
id. at 766 (“[W]e hold that a parent cannot charge his/her child’s other parent
with tortious interference . . . if both parents have equal rights, or substantially
equal rights, . . . to establish or maintain a parental or custodial relationship with
their child.”).
315. Id. at 734.
316. One commentator traces the tort to an 1897 case, while noting the role
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort
Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 795–99 (2007)
(discussing the seminal case of Wilkinson v. Downton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 57, and the
tort’s refinement in § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965).
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independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.317
The cause of action generally requires the following elements:
“(1) a person acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct was
extreme and outrageous, (3) the conduct caused the plaintiff’s
emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress was severe.”318 A
person who acts recklessly or intentionally is liable under this
tort.319 Further, “intent is defined to include situations in which
the actor does not desire a certain result, but is substantially
certain that a given result may occur.”320 Since the emotional
distress associated with rightful separation in adoption is
well-known,321 there would be little difficulty in establishing that
an adoption agency worker could be substantially certain that a
wrongful separation would cause emotional distress.322 As I wrote
in a previous article,
Mothers considering relinquishment report “conflicting feelings
of shame, pride, desolation, excitement, fear, terror, and
denial,” which “can be overwhelming and disruptive.” In the
period immediately following relinquishment, birth mothers
report that relinquishment brings “a powerful sense of loss and
isolation.” Birth mothers reported traumatic dreams, sleep
317. See id. at 852–83 (providing a state-by-state catalogue of each
jurisdiction’s law on intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also
Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress as
Independent Tort; “Outrage”, 38 A.L.R. 4th 998, §§ 4–5 (1985) (collecting and
analyzing cases decided since 1970 in which courts recognized or refused to
recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage as an independent
tort).
318. Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 217 (Tex. App. 2010) (citing Bradford v.
Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001)); see also Reagan v. City of Knoxville, 692
F. Supp. 2d 891, 905 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (“[T]he plaintiff must show that a
defendant’s conduct was (1) intentional or reckless; (2) so outrageous that it
cannot be tolerated in a civilized society; and (3) the cause of serious mental injury
to the plaintiff.” (quoting Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997))).
319. See Kircher, supra note 316, at 798 (“[T]he actor is subject to liability if
he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress . . . .” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965))).
320. See id. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW.
INST. 1965)).
321. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 138–40 (reviewing psychological studies
showing both short-term and long-term psychological effects of relinquishing a
child for adoption).
322. See id. at 138 (describing the “powerful sense of loss and isolation” and
other traumatic effects that birth mothers reported experiencing following a
rightful relinquishment).
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disruption, and “a sense that the experience is surreal.” One
study reported that fifty-five percent of birth mothers found
signing the adoption papers to be “one of the most difficult parts
of the adoption process,” and sixty-five percent of birth mothers
reported feeling grief six months after birth . . . . In one study of
birth mothers who returned to school after relinquishment,
researchers found that the negative emotions felt by birth
mothers adversely affected school performance. The birth
mothers who experienced the most deterioration in school
performance were preoccupied with grief and regret concerning
the relinquishment decision and thought frequently about their
personal loss. The majority of birth mothers expressed negative
expectations about the future, expecting the bleakness they
currently experienced to continue into the future.323

In addition to immediate emotional distress, birth mothers
experience long-term negative effects of adoption relinquishment
on their emotions and psychological well-being that can last a
lifetime.324 Birth fathers who lost a child to adoption report similar
psychological effects.325
In Smith v. Malouf,326 the Mississippi Supreme Court
recognized that a birth father stated a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress when the birth mother
and her parents conspired to deny him his parental rights.327 In
that case, the birth parents were teenaged and unwed.328 Upon
learning of the pregnancy, Joey, the birth father, offered marriage
323. See id. at 138–39 (internal citations omitted).
324. See ROBIN WINKLER & MARGARET VAN KEPPEL, RELINQUISHING MOTHERS
IN ADOPTION: THEIR LONG-TERM ADJUSTMENT 15 (1984) (conducting a study that
revealed women who had relinquished a child fifteen to nineteen years earlier
reported still experiencing intermittent or sustained mild depression, generalized
anxiety disorder, and borderline personality or dependent personality disorder);
George M. Burnell & Mary Ann Norfleet, Women Who Place Their Infant Up for
Adoption: A Pilot Study, 16 PATIENT COUNSELING & HEALTH EDUC. 169 (1979).
325. See Seymore, supra note 287, at 848–49 (observing that birth fathers
report feeling emotional distress after the adoption if they acquired a sense of
fatherhood during the pregnancy, and describe the adoption as producing “deep
and long-lasting feelings”).
326. 722 So. 2d 490 (Miss. 1998).
327. See id. at 493 (“The court erred in ruling that . . . [the plaintiff] . . . has
no parental rights to receive notice of any adoption of, or to object to any adoption
of, or to seek legal custody upon the birth of, his biological child.”).
328. Id.
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but Natalie, the birth mother, said no.329 Joey said that he wished
to raise the child on his own, but Natalie and her parents, the
Maloufs, insisted that the child be placed for adoption.330 His
attempts to change their minds were to no avail.331 When he went
to Natalie’s home one last time, her parents told him “that Natalie
was gone and that she would not be back until the child was
born.”332 At that point, Joey initiated legal proceedings for
paternity and custody and sought an injunction to prevent any
adoption.333 A mutual friend called Joey and asked him to drop the
suit, informing him that Natalie said she would not put the child
up for adoption if he did so.334 The court granted a temporary
restraining order to prevent any adoptive placement and issued a
permanent injunction, which Joey sent to every office of Vital
Statistics in Mississippi in an attempt to prevent an adoption.335
Natalie ultimately moved to Georgia, where she gave birth.336 Joey
discovered her location after hiring a private investigator and went
to Georgia to start legal action, but by then Natalie and her mother
had traveled to California and placed the child for adoption in
Canada.337
In recognizing that the facts as pled gave rise to a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court
noted
It is irrefutable that appellees’ behavior was intentional and
that the foreseeable result of their actions was that the child
would be adopted by strangers, thereby depriving Joey of an
opportunity to veto the adoption and vie for custody. It is also
axiomatic that any father—especially a father who has gone
329. See id. at 492 (noting that the couple did discuss their options regarding
the baby, although no immediate decision was made).
330. Id.
331. See id. (stressing that the Maloufs remained firm regarding the child’s
adoption, even after Joey’s parents allegedly “kidnapped and badgered” Natalie
about their decision).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See id. (noting that the injunction enjoined Natalie “and all who might
assist her” from proceeding with an adoption).
336. Id.
337. See id. (detailing Joey’s travels to Georgia to retain an attorney to assist
in obtaining custody of the child and the child’s adoption to Canadian parents).
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that “extra mile” to gain custody of his child—would suffer
severe emotional distress due to the child he wanted being
secretly placed for adoption.338

The court also found that Joey stated a cause of action for
conspiracy to deprive him of his lawful rights as natural parent of
the child.339
When the interference with the parent–child relationship is
wrongful, courts have accepted causes of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.340 In Gouin v. Gouin,341 a mother
stated a cause of action against her estranged husband for
intentional infliction of emotional distress when he tried on six
occasions to coerce her into relinquishing custody of their
children.342 He filed unsupported criminal charges against her and
then “Gouin and his attorney visited Dori’s divorce counsel at her
office and offered to drop the application in exchange for Dori
granting legal custody of their children to Gouin.”343 Cases where
adoption agencies use undue influence and coercion to secure
release of a child for adoption could similarly give rise to liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.344 Similar to Gouin,
338. Id. at 498.
339. See id. (“The instant claim is that the defendants conspired to unlawfully
violate the outstanding injunction and to deprive Joey of his lawful rights as
natural parent of the child. These allegations are sufficient to pass Rule 12(b)(6)
muster . . . .”). Without terming this cause of action “tortious interference with
parental rights,” as recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the action
seems to qualify. For further discussion of tortious interference with parental
rights, see discussion supra Part III.B.
340. See, e.g., Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 337 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that
the birth mother wrongfully prevented rehabilitation of the relationship between
the father and his child following a divorce supported the claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Bhama v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988) (choosing not to address the issue of a psychiatrist father allegedly
brainwashing his children into rejecting their mother).
341. 249 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 2003).
342. See id. at 73 (“[Plaintiff] cites to six separate incidents in which she
claims [the defendant] knew or should have known that his conduct would have
caused her emotional distress.”).
343. Id. at 68.
344. See discussion infra Part V (proposing a cause of action for wrongful
separation where an agency or adoption worker attempts to secure a
relinquishment of parental rights through fraud or trickery, or through coercion
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the Supreme Court of Louisiana found consent to adoption invalid
due to duress when the birth mother signed after a lengthy
discussion and warning by the attorney for the adoptive parents
that she could face criminal charges for child neglect if she did not
relinquish the child.345 Threats of criminal charges could well
amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress.346
D. Legal Malpractice/Lawyer Misconduct
Lawyers frequently facilitate adoption placements and, of
course, provide the legal work necessary to make children
available for adoption and to create new permanent parent–child
relationships.347 Thus, lawyers can incur significant legal risks
themselves for any misconduct in that regard.348 Legal malpractice
is a risk of doing business for lawyers. One long-time legal
malpractice defense attorney wrote
Malpractice is becoming increasingly widespread, lawyers
hardly ever win in jury trials, and settlement amounts are
skyrocketing. An analysis of the 106 legal malpractice jury
or undue influence).
345. See Wuertz v. Craig, 458 So. 2d 1311, 1313 (La. 1984) (“There is no
evidence that such [criminal] charges were justified. She signed the act under the
immediate influence of [the attorney’s] threat. Such a threat by law invalidates
the consent procured.”).
346. See, e.g., Nigro v. Pickett, No. 9435/05, 2006 WL 940636, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 17, 2006) (“[U]nder some circumstances threats of unjustified criminal
charges . . . may rise to the level of outrageousness to sustain a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
347. See, e.g., Lemley v. Kaiser, No. 1804, 1987 WL 10774, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 30, 1987) (involving the actions of two duly licensed and practicing Ohio
attorneys who failed to follow the state’s private adoption placement provisions);
Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 557 (Va. 2012) (describing the role of the
attorneys and the Utah adoption agency in facilitating the adoption of Baby E.Z.).
348. See, e.g., supra notes 305–310 and accompanying text (condemning the
actions of the adoption agency in intentionally trying to prevent the biological
father from legally establishing his parental rights and subjecting the adoption
attorneys to harsh criticism where they urged the birth mother to make false
statements to the birth father regarding the child’s adoption); Lemley, 1987 WL
10774, at *1 (referring to the matter as a “tragic illegal adoption dispute”
facilitated by the adoption attorneys); In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 302 (Mo. 2016)
(en banc) (suspending the birth mother’s adoption attorney from the practice of
law for six months for committing multiple violations of the rules of professional
conduct in an adoption proceeding).
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verdicts in Los Angeles County in 1988 and 1989 showed that
lawyers lost ninety-three percent of the time. Similarly, the
Author’s own analysis of forty-two legal malpractice cases in
southern California, thirty-three of which were disposed of
between 1991 and 1992, showed that, consistent with his prior
experience in over nine-hundred cases, an overwhelming
eighty-eight percent of the clients or non-clients suing for legal
malpractice were compensated, and the average settlement was
a significant $60,393.349

Generally, legal malpractice requires the following elements:
(1) the duty of an attorney to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as members of the profession commonly possess and
exercise, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a proximate causal
connection between the breach and the resulting injury, and
(4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney’s
negligence.350

Legal malpractice actions, where birth parents are
represented by counsel, might provide recourse for wrongful family
separation. However, several issues might prevent such liability.
Oftentimes, birth parents are not represented by counsel during
an adoption and state laws rarely require such representation.351
Oftentimes, even if birth parents are represented by counsel, they
are not provided independent counsel and instead are represented
by the same attorney representing the adoptive parents.352 In
Maryland, for example, the statute providing for appointed counsel
for minor mothers does not explicitly require counsel to be
independent and allows the attorney to represent the adoption
agency or prospective adoptive parents to the extent that the
general conflict of interest rules of professional conduct would

349. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1661 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
350. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 192 (Supp. 2018).
351. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 129 (“Independent legal counsel for a
prospective birth mother is not universally required in the United States.”).
352. See id. at 129–30 (noting that only four states require minors to have
independent legal counsel, meaning that the attorney cannot also represent the
adoptive parents or the adoption agency facilitating the placement).
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permit.353 In In re J.M.P.,354 the birth mother was represented by
the law partner of the lawyer representing the prospective
adoptive parents.355 While Louisiana’s state statute required that
she be represented by counsel, it did not require independent
counsel.356 The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that the
lawyer was not prohibited from representing the birth mother,
Dawn, despite the potential that his representation could be
“materially limited by his own interest in preventing abortions by
promoting adoptions.”357
In Lemley v. Barr,358 Tammy, the minor birth mother, was
deceived by the lawyers handling the adoption.359 She
subsequently brought a legal malpractice action against the
lawyers.360 She sought recovery of legal fees expended to recover

353. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-307(c) (2008) (“An attorney or firm may
represent more than one party in a case under this subtitle only if the Maryland
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct allow.”).
354. 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988), superseded by statute, LA. CHILD. CODE ANN.
art. 1143 (2013), as stated in In re A.J.F., 764 So. 2d 47 (La. 2000).
355. See id. at 1005 (“[Counsel for the adoptive parents] brought along his law
partner . . . to act as [the birth mother’s] attorney and to advise her of her
rights.”).
356. See id. at 1010 (“At the time of the act of surrender [the
statute] . . . provided simply that ‘the surrendering parent or parents shall be
represented by an attorney at the execution of the act of surrender.’” (citing LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:422.7 (repealed 1992)). After the time the birth mother, Dawn,
executed her consent, the legislature explicitly added language requiring that an
attorney for a birth mother “shall not be the attorney who represents the person
or persons who are the prospective adoptive parents, or an attorney who is a
partner or employee of the attorney or law firm representing the prospective
adoptive parents.” Id. (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.7 (repealed 1992)). However,
there was no such language at the time Dawn executed her consent. Id.
357. Id. at 1012. The court did not rest its decision on whether a conflict of
interest existed, but rather looked to determine “if there was any other factor
which may have prevented Dawn from making a voluntary and knowing
surrender” and concluded that there was none. See id. (“The record reflects that
Dawn was a young adult capable of exercising her own judgment.”).
358. 43 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1986).
359. See id. at 103 (“[T]he young couple returned to the law offices, executed
the papers, and relinquished the child . . . . At no time did [the adoption attorney]
explain to Tammy . . . or Tammy’s parents that under [applicable state] law,
a[] . . . Probate Court judge had to witness and approve a minor’s consent.”).
360. Lemley v. Kaiser, No. 1804, 1987 WL 10774, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr.
30, 1987). She also brought causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and
negligent or intentional interference with right to custody. Id. at *2.
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her child, other compensatory damages, and punitive damages.361
The trial court initially granted her motion for summary
judgement on liability against the Kaiser firm.362 However, the
lower court sua sponte reconsidered and entered summary
judgement in favor of the lawyers.363 The Ohio Court of Appeals
agreed, finding that no attorney-client relationship existed
between Tammy and the lawyers.364 It was not enough that
Tammy might have believed the lawyers were representing her,
since “[t]he Kaiser firm here engaged in no representations or
conduct which could reasonably induce [Tammy] to believe they
represented her.”365
It may not, however, be so straightforward as to who the
attorney is representing in the adoption. As two adoption law
attorneys note
For example, some attorneys easily slip into taking on dual roles
or become overly zealous in representing a client’s interests,
possibly leading to lack of clarity as to who is owed the duty of
care. It is also too easy for attorneys to become caught up in the
view that family formation work always exemplifies goodness
and morality, possibly causing them to disregard the interests
of the other parent as the lawyer marches toward the goal of
creating a new and legally recognized parent/child
relationship.366

The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division found, in
circumstances similar to the Lemley case, that the attorney was, in
fact, representing the birth mother.367 The case was not a legal
361. Id. at *2.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See id. at *4 (“It is clear that no formal, explicit relationship existed. A
retainer was never signed, [Tammy] paid no legal fees to the Kaiser firm, nor did
the firm ever send her a bill.”).
365. Id. at *5.
366. See Dana E. Prescott & Gary A. Debele, Shifting Ethical and Social
Conundrums and “Stunningly Anachronistic” Laws: What Lawyers in Adoption
and Assisted Reproduction May Want to Consider, 30 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 127, 153 (2017) (discussing both ARTs and adoption cases).
367. See Tierney v. Flower, 32 A.d.2d 392, 396 (N.Y. App. 1969) (“[W]hile [the
lawyer-appellant] maintained that he never represented the petitioner and her
parents and acted only for his anonymous clients, it is our view that actually the
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malpractice case, but resolution did turn on whether the lawyer
was representing the birth mother.368 The court held that the
attorney was representing “both sides of the transaction in which
he acted” where the birth mother had no attorney of her own and
the prospective adoptive parents’ attorney prepared papers for the
birth mother’s signature.369 He advised the birth mother of her
legal rights with respect to the adoption process, including her
right to appear and to object in the adoption proceeding.370
The Lemley court was following the traditional rule that “an
attorney is not liable to a non-client for malpractice in the
performance of professional services.”371 There is an exception to
this rule, however, where the attorney committed fraud or
collusion or other intentional misconduct.372 There, the lawyer may
be liable to non-clients.373 In a non-adoption case, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division found a viable cause of action
where the attorney took affirmative steps to prevent the proceeds
from a settlement agreement from being disbursed to a
non-client.374 He “afforded substantial assistance to his client by
concealing the sale of the property from third-party plaintiff and
her attorney and directing the buyer to wire the sale proceeds
appellant represented both sides of the transaction . . . .”).
368. See id. (involving the lawyer’s duty to reveal the adoptive parents’
identity to the birth parents where the adoptive parents requested “a veil of
secrecy”).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Alan L. Cohen, Liability to Non-Clients for Malpractice, 3 PERSONAL
INJURY—ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 11.06 (2018).
372. See id. (“An adversary party may have a cause of action against an
attorney for fraudulent, malicious, or intentional misrepresentations.”);
Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1551 (1994) (“Where once only the client could bring a
malpractice action against the lawyer, now third parties can bring
lawsuits . . . .”).
373. See Cohen, supra note 371 (discussing other unprofessional or
intentional conduct for which the attorney may be liable to third parties,
including conspiracy, “insulting and abusive language that causes mental
distress,” and false imprisonment); see, e.g., Goerke v. Vojvodich, 226 N.W.2d 211,
215 (Wis. 1975) (stating the seller’s lawyer could be liable to the buyers for
misrepresentations with intent to mislead or misinform during negotiations for a
property transaction).
374. See Sayles v. Ferone, 137 A.D.3d 486, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (finding
a viable claim against the attorney for aiding and abetting conversion).
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directly into plaintiff’s account at a small out-of-state bank, rather
than depositing the proffered check into his escrow account.”375 The
facts translate into the adoption context, sounding eerily familiar
to a recent case where a long-time adoption attorney was
sanctioned for concealment on behalf of his birth mother client
from the birth father.
In In re Krigel,376 an experienced adoption law attorney was
suspended from the practice of law because of his conduct directed
at the birth father.377 The attorney represented the birth mother,
but knew (1) the identity of the birth father, (2) that he did not
consent to the adoption, and (3) that he was represented by
counsel.378 Nonetheless, at the hearing on the birth mother’s
relinquishment of her parental rights, her attorney solicited
testimony from the birth mother that the birth father had been
consulted and that he had “not stepped forward since the birth of
the child claiming any rights to the child.”379 It would have been
difficult for the birth father to step forward, since he was deceived
as to the due date of the child, was not told that the child was born
and was not informed of the hearing. The court found violations of
the duty of candor in lawyer Krigel’s representation to the trial
court: “by permitting false and misleading testimony to be
presented, [it] was designed to portray the false impression that
Birth Father was not interested in the child or in asserting his
parental rights.”380 The lawyer also lied to the birth father’s lawyer
when he assured him that the child would not be placed for
375. Id.
376. 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
377. See id. at 302 (staying the suspension subject to successful completion of
a two-year term of probation).
378. See id. at 309 (Fischer, J., dissenting)
[G]iven [the attorney’s understanding of the father’s identity and
wishes], Respondent’s conduct, including his conversation with [the
birth father’s attorney], his instructions to the mother and her family
to have no communication with the father, and his overall
implementation of his “passive strategy” to “actively do nothing,” had
no substantial purpose other than to impair and delay the father’s
assertion of his parental rights . . . .
379. Id. at 298.
380. Id. at 299.

ADOPTING CIVIL DAMAGES

955

adoption without the father’s consent, and had already at that time
told the birth mother to cut off all contact with the birth father
about the child’s birth and the adoption.381 When the birth father
learned of the birth of the child and that the child had been placed
with prospective adoptive parents, he intervened and the trial
court denied the adoption and awarded the birth father legal and
physical custody of the child.382 Without that resolution, the lawyer
might well have faced a lawsuit for tortious interference with
parental rights together with the sanction from the disciplinary
authorities. Furthermore, the case falls squarely within the
general rule that “attorneys may owe a duty of care to nonclients
when the attorneys know, or should know, that nonclients will rely
on the attorney’s representations and the nonclients are not too
remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection.”383
V. Proposing a New Cause of Action: Wrongful Family Separation
Ever has it been that love knows not its own depth until the
hour of separation.
—Kahlil Gibran384

Torts can be viewed as simply a way to redress private
grievances. But it can also be theorized, as John Goldberg notes,
as “occasions for judges and juries to regulate behavior on a
forward-looking basis.”385 In this view, “tort had transformed itself
from private to ‘public’ law, whereby it functioned to achieve
collective, not corrective, justice.”386 From this perspective, tort law
“can, in principle, deter the defendant and other similarly situated
actors from engaging in conduct [the courts] deem undesirable.”387
A social justice variant of this view considers that tort law “permits
381. See id. at 298 (“Krigel represented to Zimmerman that the child would
not be adopted without Birth Father’s consent.”).
382. Id.
383. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 221, Westlaw (database updated Feb.
2019).
384. KHALIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET 9 (1973).
385. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513,
524 (2003).
386. Id.
387. Id. at 525.
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independent judges and especially juries to hold corporate America
and other powerful actors accountable.”388 And, praising the
flexibility of tort law, Michael Rustad noted, “The great value of
torts lies in its ability to evolve to meet the emergent harms of each
era.”389 As one court noted, “Although loathe to create new causes
of action in tort, the law must nevertheless adapt to the society in
which it exists.”390 Scholars and reformers have proposed the
creation of new torts to address changes in society: a tort for
private suppression of speech;391 a tort action for racial insults;392
for spoliation;393 for workplace sexual harassment;394 for negligent
interference with credit;395 for computer and software
malfunction;396 and for seduction.397 Some calls for new torts have
388. Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 460
(2011).
389. Id. at 521.
390. Silver v. Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., 692 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999).
391. See Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech From Private Abridgement:
Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 223, 242 (1996) (“Like all
torts, a mixture of justice and policy combine to make suppression a worthwhile
tort action.”).
392. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 149 (1982) (arguing
that “[t]he psychological, sociological, and political repercussions of the racial
insult demonstrate the need for judicial relief”).
393. See Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend
Towards Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39
(1993) (noting that some states have recognized spoliation as a distinct tort due
to its regularity and frequency in civil litigation).
394. See Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (1986) (stating that
“tort law is the only body of law that provides a private remedy for personal harm
caused by sexual harassment,” but that “[i]n its present form . . . tort law fails to
deal with the full effects of harassment on the individual victim”).
395. See Leonard J. Long, An Uneasy Case for a Tort of Negligent Interference
with Credit Contract, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 236 (2003) (“[T]he thesis of this
paper is that the law should at least recognize a very narrow and circumscribed
tort of negligent interference with [credit] contract.”).
396. See Rustad, supra note 388, at 548 (“The courts have all said no to
recognizing a new tort of computer malpractice and the result is that software
makers disclaim all liability and limit their warranties and enjoy a lawsuit
immunity zone.”).
397. See Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good
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been quite successful, including in 1939, William Prosser’s call for
a new tort for intentional infliction of emotional suffering,398 and
in 1890, Samuel D. Warren’s and Louis D. Brandeis’ call to
recognize a right to privacy.399
All these proposals begin with a recognition of some significant
right that needs protection through tort remedy. The right of
parents in their children is such a right, elevated to constitutional
importance.400 The rights of parents vis-à-vis their children include
the right to custody and visitation,401 the right to control education

Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374,
382– 412 (1993) (noting the history of the tort of seduction and its current
application in modern law).
398. See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874 (1939) (“It is time to recognize that the courts have
created a new tort. . . . It consists of the intentional, outrageous infliction of
mental suffering in an extreme form.”).
399. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890) (arguing for a right to privacy, such as the right
found at the time in France).
400. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (noting that Mississippi
cannot deprive M.L.B. “because of her poverty, [of] appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a
parent”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The private interest here,
that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”); Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (“[W]e think it entirely plain that the
Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (guaranteeing as fundamental an individual’s
right to “establish a home and bring up children”).
401. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (affirming the Washington
Supreme Court’s holding that “parents have a right to limit visitation of their
children with third persons”); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (recognizing a parent’s
interest in “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children”); In re Pensom, 126 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex. App. 2003) (citing Troxel in
saying that “[e]ncompassed within the well-established fundamental right of
parents to raise their children is the right to determine with whom their children
should associate”).
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and training,402 the right to the earnings of the child,403 and the
right to inherit from or through the child.404 Additionally, it
includes “the necessity for the parent to consent to the adoption of
the child.”405 Because of the fundamental nature of parental rights,
when a state seeks to terminate parental rights involuntarily
(without the parent’s consent), the Constitution requires a
heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence.406
Before a parent can relinquish that right, the relinquishment must
be fully voluntary.407 Existing tort law may not fully vindicate
these rights, calling for recognition of a new tort to fully protect
parental rights when interfered with by adoption agencies and
adoption workers, including lawyers.
Wrongful separation of children and parents needs a new tort
to supplement existing tort causes of action. As discussed
previously, existing causes of action may present issues because of
questions as to consent, legal right to establish a relationship for
unwed fathers, relationship between birth parents and the lawyers
involved in the adoption, measures of damages, and the like.
402. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35 (identifying directing the upbringing and
education of children as a liberty interest of parents and guardians); Barrett v.
Steubenville City Schs., 388 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is clearly
established that parents have a fundamental right to direct the education of their
children.”); J.W.J. v. P.K.R., 999 So. 2d 943, 951 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (“It is a
custodial parent’s fundamental right to direct and control the upbringing and
education of his or her child.”).
403. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118–19 (1989) (listing the
right to a child’s services and earnings as a right of parenthood); N.A.H. v. S.L.S.,
9 P.3d 354, 359 (Colo. 2000) (“The determination of parenthood includes the right
to parenting time; the right to direct the child’s activities; the right to make
decisions regarding the control, education, and health of the child; and the right
to the child’s services and earnings.”).
404. See, e.g., McCabe v. McCabe, 78 P.3d 956, 958 (Okla. 2003) (observing
the right of a parent to inherit from or through their child); see also Paula A.
Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 257, 262 (1994) (noting the long-standing common law rule that
fathers had “the right to inherit their children’s estates in intestacy.”).
405. McCabe, 78 P.3d at 958.
406. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 148 (“When a state seeks to terminate
parental rights involuntarily (without the parent’s consent), the Constitution
requires a heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence.”).
407. See id. (stating that “[v]oluntary relinquishment of parental rights cuts
off all parental rights”).
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Although those issues are not insurmountable, a new cause of
action could be constructed to avoid these issues, and in so doing
deter the kind of misconduct that has led to wrongful family
separation. The elements of such a cause of action would be as
follows: (1) a duty owed by adoption professionals to preserve
parental rights to biological parents, including birth fathers; (2) a
breach of that duty by fraud, trickery, deceit, duress, coercion,
undue influence or other wrongful act; (3) a resulting harm to the
parent–child relationship; and (4) a finding of damages, including
noneconomic damages.
A new cause of action should recognize a duty owed by
adoption professionals to birth parents to preserve parental rights.
The duty should be owed to both birth parents, even biological
fathers who have not yet been recognized as having legal rights.408
The duty must be strong enough to offset the agency’s profit motive
to serve those paying the fees, adoptive parents.409 An agency or
adoption worker owes that duty to birth parents regardless of
whether the birth parent is formally a client of the agency or
adoption worker or adoption lawyer.410 An agency or adoption
worker breaches the duty when it attempts to secure a
relinquishment of parental rights through fraud or trickery, or
through coercion or undue influence.411 Adoption counseling
should be truly neutral, without an agenda to secure consent to
adoption and only after a birth parent has been fully informed of
his or her parental rights.412 An agency would fulfil its duty to fully
408. As previously noted, some courts reject claims for tortious interference
with parental rights for birth fathers who have not yet secured legal recognition
of rights. Under this new cause of action, such result should be foreclosed.
409. See supra Part II for a discussion of the business motivation of adoption
agencies.
410. For further discussion concerning the difficulty of legal malpractice
actions when birth parents are not seen as the client of the lawyer handling the
adoption for adoptive parents, see supra notes 376–383 and accompanying text.
The new cause of action seeks to avoid that result.
411. See supra Part IV for a discussion of fraud, coercion and undue influence.
412. See, e.g., Methodist Mission Home v. N.A.B., 451 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.
App. 1970) (examining a case where the plaintiff was coerced by her counselor
into consenting to the adoption of her child); In re Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 178
(Ct. App. Wash. 1982), discussed, supra at text accompanying footnotes 264, 266,
and 273. For a description of adoption counseling that masquerades as
non-directive, while steering a prospective birth mother toward relinquishment,
see Seymore, supra note 7, at 117–19 (describing counseling materials provided
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inform birth parents of their parental rights if it provided
independent legal counsel for each birth parent. In a previous
article, I outlined the advice such an attorney should provide:
a. legal rights and responsibility of parents;
b. consequences of termination of parental rights for the legal
rights and responsibility of parents, including rights of
inheritance, confidentiality of adoption records, and legal
requirements for future contact between parent and child;
c. circumstances in which the relinquishment of parental
rights can be revoked and consent to adoption can be
withdrawn;
d. availability or unavailability of post-adoption contact
agreements in the relevant jurisdiction and the legal
enforceability of such agreements;
e. legal obligation of both parents to provide financial support
for their child and the availability of state services to
determine paternity and enforce child support orders;
f. eligibility of birth parent and child for state and federal
welfare assistance;
g. right of the parent to be present in court for termination of
parental rights and/or finalization of adoption and the right
to waive such right; and
h. limitation on any representation of the parent, including a
statement that the attorney will not be representing the
parent in any contested adoption.413

When there has been a breach of the duty owed, the harm to
the parent–child relationship should include any family
separation, even if birth parents ultimately regain custody and
retain parental rights. In a case like In re Krigel,414 for instance,
where the adoption attorney systematically worked to exclude the
birth father but the birth father ultimately prevailed and gained
custody, the lawyer should be liable for the period of separation
by the National Council for Adoption, an advocacy group for adoptive parents and
adoption agencies).
413. Seymore, supra note 7, at 154–56.
414. 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016).
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before the child was returned to the parent.415 Damages should
include loss of consortium, emotional pain and suffering, and the
costs associated in seeking to regain custody of children.416
Punitive damages should also be available.
VI. Conclusion
Arguing for ethical adoption practices should be as simple as
doing the right thing because it is right. After all, the well-being of
families and children is of paramount importance to society. But
when one recognizes that adoption practitioners are motivated by
the same business issues facing any corporation making and
selling widgets, we recognize that the incentives may change
perversely. As business ethicists Ronald Francis and Anona
Armstrong put it, “Ethics has often been seen as something outside
normal business practice—something that is good and proper, good
to have, but something of a luxury in the turmoil and competitive
environment of the business world.”417 But ethical practice can be
viewed as part of an effective risk management strategy.418 Francis
argues for ethical principles that seem equally relevant to adoption
agencies and widget-makers, such as dignity in treating
disempowered suppliers, prudence in making bad situations no
worse, avoidance of suffering, and honesty and openness in “not
concealing that which should be revealed.”419 To the extent that
aspirational ethical standards are not persuasive to a business, he
reminds us that “legal compliance must have primacy.”420
Tort law is about more than compensation for victims. “Civil
justice for plaintiffs derives from the fairness of the process, the
right to have one’s story told, meaningful remedy, and one
415. For discussion of Krigel, see supra notes 376–383 and accompanying text.
416. This would be in line with damages awardable in causes of action for
tortious interference with parental rights and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In addition, this would avoid any problems of economic damages in fraud
actions.
417. Ronald Francis & Anona Armstrong, Ethics as a Risk Management
Strategy: The Australian Experience, 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 375, 375 (2003).
418. See id. at 376 (arguing “that there are compelling reasons to consider
good ethical practices to be an essential part of risk management”).
419. Id.
420. Id. at 378.
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additional factor: plaintiffs ask the legal system to take steps to
prevent repetition of their tragedy.”421 Wrongful family separation
in adoption can be deterred by lawsuits for money damages.
Agencies are not exclusively social welfare institutions, they are
businesses. Recall that one adoption worker conceded, ruefully,
“We provide a fabulous service, but at the end of the day, we are a
business.”422 As businesses, they need to maximize profits by
reducing costs. Minimizing the risk of litigation has motivated
adoption agencies to change behavior in the past, in the context of
wrongful adoption, and will likely do so in the future. Agencies,
adoption workers, and adoption lawyers that do not prioritize
family preservation face legal risk in lawsuits for fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference
with parental rights, and legal malpractice. Further, courts may
well be persuaded to recognize a new tort for wrongful family
separation.

421. Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 182
(2011).
422. Alyssa Hollis, Adoption Agency Director, in ELIZABETH RALEIGH, SELLING
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION: FAMILIES, MARKETS, AND THE COLOR LINE 30 (2018).

